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ABSTRACT 
States (principals) frequently employ pro-government militias (agents) in low 
intensity conflicts with mixed results. In some cases, principal and agent interests diverge 
or the principal loses control over its agent, which devolves into an autonomous terrorist, 
warlord, or criminal organization. Looking at historical cases of Latin American 
pro-government militias from Colombia (Self-Defense groups, Convivirs, and Hometown 
Soldiers) and Peru (Rondas Campesinas), I examined the principal-agent problem in the 
context of state-sponsored, pro-government militias and answered the following 
question: How do sponsor states succeed or fail in maintaining positive control and 
influence over pro-government militias? States fail when they grant too much autonomy 
and firepower to militias and succeed when they limit militias’ autonomy by subjecting 
them to a tailored combination of control mechanisms: monitoring, screening, sanctions, 
and rewards. Cases from Colombia and Peru demonstrate that the best way to control 
militias and employ them in counterinsurgency is by incorporating them as legitimate 
auxiliaries of the armed forces. Incorporation of a militia into the armed forces greatly 
reduces the principal-agent problem, the associated risk of diverging interests and 
objectives, and the future pain of demobilization. Arming militias with restricted use 
weapons, outsourcing their financing to private benefactors, and granting them too much 
autonomy is a recipe for disaster. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
States (principals) frequently employ pro-government militias (agents) in low 
intensity conflicts with mixed results. In some cases, principal and agent interests diverge 
or the principal loses control over its agent, which devolves into an autonomous terrorist, 
rebel, warlord, or criminal organization.  For example, the Rondas Campesinas in Peru is 
considered a relative success for integration, control, and strategic effect, while the Self-
Defense groups of 1980s Colombia is a worst-case scenario of pro-government militias 
growing out of control and even threatening the stability of the sponsor government. 
Looking at historical cases of Latin American pro-government militias from Colombia 
(Self-Defense groups, Convivirs, and Hometown Soldiers) and Peru (Rondas Campesinas), 
I examined the principal-agent problem in the context of state-sponsored, pro-government 
militias and answered the following question: How do sponsor states succeed or fail in 
maintaining positive control and influence over pro-government militias? States fail when 
they grant too much autonomy and firepower to militias and they succeed when they limit 
militias’ autonomy by subjecting them to a tailored combination of control mechanisms: 
monitoring, screening, sanctions, and rewards. Cases from the Colombian and Peruvian 
civil wars demonstrate that the best way to control militias and employ them in 
counterinsurgency is by incorporating them as legitimate auxiliaries of the armed forces. 
Incorporation of a militia into the Armed Forces greatly reduces the principal-agent 
problem, the associated risk of diverging interests and objectives, and the future pain of 
demobilization. As the reviewed cases demonstrate, arming militias with restricted use 
weapons, outsourcing their financing to private benefactors, and granting them too much 
autonomy is a guaranteed recipe for disaster.  
From review of the Colombia and Peru Cases, I determined the following factors 
have a notable effect on how well a state implements control mechanisms (a detailed 
explanation of each is available in Chapter VI): 
• State Capacity: Control mechanisms require personnel and resources.
Neither Colombia nor Peru were able to successfully apply control
mechanisms until they saw improved state capacity.
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• Opportunities for illicit gain: In a narco environment, control 
mechanisms will have less overall effect over militias, especially monetary 
incentives. 
• Private Benefactors: A state should avoid privatization of militia 
sponsorship at all costs or it will lose its leverage over the militia and give 
power over the militia to another non-state actor. 
• Legislation: Criminalizing militias without suppressing them first will 
make them more difficult to rein in. Small sanctions will have little to no 
effect in an informal/illicit relationship. 
• Offensive vs. Defensive Role: Because civil-defense forces are meant to 
be defensive and part of a clear-hold COIN strategy, they should only 
receive training in, and take part in defensive operations. 
• Weapons: Civil-defense forces need weapons to defend themselves and 
prevent guerrillas from returning to cleared areas, but the state should 
place limitations on the type and quantity of weapons it issues. 
Pro-government militias (PGMs), also called pro-government armed groups, 
paramilitary forces, vigilante groups, or self-defense forces, increasingly play a role in low 
intensity conflicts. Presently, Syria uses them to fight Rebel-Coalition forces and the 
Islamic State, Mexico employs village self-defense forces to counteract drug cartels, 
Nigeria uses them to combat Boko Haram, Ukraine used them to counter pro-Russian 
unrest, and Iraq uses Shia militias to combat the Islamic State. The use of PGMs by both 
strong and weak governments is not a new phenomenon and the relationship between 
government sponsors and these groups is often unsteady due to moral hazard (conflicting 
actions, goals and interests) and adverse selection (asymmetric information).   
There are many reasons why governments use PGMs; some of the most common 
reasons include plausible deniability, force multipliers, and a counterinsurgency isolation 
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strategy.1 However, more often than not, the government may lose control of these groups, 
which turn against the government or devolve into terrorist or criminal organizations, or 
even warlord para-states,2 interrupting military operations, government reforms, or the 
peace process. Human rights abuses by these groups can further inflame tensions and push 
the population away from the government. In one of the most contemporary, ongoing cases, 
there is evidence that the self-defense militias in Mexico are transforming into criminal 
organizations in their own right.3 Recent skirmishes with the government indicate that 
these groups may take the same trajectory as the Colombian paramilitaries, further 
complicating Mexico’s conflict with the cartels.4  
From the Cold War to the drug wars, nearly every country in Central and South 
America has employed PGMs in areas where security forces were weak and the U.S. 
provided billions of dollars in aid and an advisory role in a majority of these low intensity 
conflicts. In fact, both countries covered in this thesis received USAID and International 
Military Education and Training (IMET) funds.5  PGMs add a level of risk and uncertainty 
to U.S. assistance as the principal-agent dilemma not only affects the domestic government, 
but also extends to the United States. PGMs may engage in unwanted behavior, have 
conflicting goals, or inadvertently sabotage population-centric counterinsurgency 
operations.  For example, during the Salvadoran Civil War, some self-defense patrols 
1 Sabine Carey and Neil Mitchell, “Pro-Government Militias and Armed Conflict,” in Oxford Research 
Encyclopedia of Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 7.  
2 Moritz Schuberth discusses the tendency of pro-government militias to “turn bad” in “The Challenge 
of Community-Based Armed Groups: Toward a Conceptualization of Militias, Gangs, and Vigilantes,” 
Contemporary Security Policy 36, no. 2 (2015): 312. 
3 Christopher Woody, “In Mexico’s ‘Hot Land,’ citizen self-defense forces and criminal groups may be 
gearing up for more violence,” Business Insider, December 11, 2016, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/autodefensas-causing-violence-in-guerrero-and-michoacan-in-mexico-
2016-12. 
4 Marguerite Cawley, “Mexico Vigilante Legalization Raises Paramilitary Concerns,” InSight Crime, 
January 28, 2014, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/mexico-vigilante-legalization-raises-
paramilitary-concerns. 
5 “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook),” USAID, November 26, 2013, 
https://www.usaid.gov/data/dataset/49c01560-6cd7-4bbc-bfef-7a1991867633. 
 4 
dually acted as rightwing death squads and sabotaged U.S. led COIN efforts by 
assassinating land reform administrators.6  
The literature on pro-government militias tends to focus on why states delegate 
security and violence to PGMs and the impact of these relationships on human rights. I 
seek to bring more understanding to an aspect of the principal–agent (PA) relationship least 
approached in the PGM literature: the how factor. Few works focus on how states try to 
control militias and manage the high risks associated with sponsorship. Carey and Mitchell 
acknowledge this gap in the literature: “we need to know more about the details of the 
‘contract’ between these groups and their respective governments…we need to know 
[their] lines of communication. Is there a functional equivalent of the chain of command 
found in regular forces?  When are militia members most likely to shirk?”7 Moreover, the 
majority of literature deals with cases in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. I intend 
to fill a gap in the literature by analyzing PGMs in Latin America, which is a gold mine for 
scholars who wish to study how states interact with, and how much they exert control over 
pro-government militias. PGMs have been a staple of the Latin American political 
landscape since Spanish colonialism, when territory was divided between caudillo 
oligarchs, who ran feudal agricultural and ranch estates with the protection of private 
militias.8 Thus, reaching into the wealth of case studies from Latin America, I intend to 
contribute to the small, but growing body of literature on the principal-agent problem and 
pro-government militias. 
Principal-Agent (PA) Problem. The PA problem applies to a wide range of areas 
from economics, to legislation, to civil military relations. According to the Encyclopedia 
of Power, the PA problem “represents situations in which [one party] (principal) delegates 
a task to another [party] (agent), who has specialized knowledge about the task; but, also 
                                                 
6 Central Intelligence Agency, “El Salvador: Controlling Right Wing Terrorism,” doc. no. 0000075083 
(Intelligence Report, Washington, DC: CIA, 1985), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000075083.pdf. 
7 Carey and Mitchell, “Pro-Government Militias in Armed Conflict,” 26. 




has objectives that are different from those of the principal.”9  Underpinning the core 
challenge of divergent objectives, a root cause of the PA problem is asymmetric 
information. Some of the most common situations that arise in the PA relationship are as 
follows: A) Moral Hazard occurs when the principal cannot control or observe the agent’s 
actions and the agent may take unnecessary risks or act in his own interest, assuming the 
principal will incur the costs.10 B) Adverse Selection occurs when the agent has 
information unknown to the principal prior to entering the relationship or contract.11  C) 
Agent shirking is when “an agent minimizes the effort it exerts on its principal’s behalf.”12 
D) Agency slack is an “independent, undesired action by an agent.”13 All of these issues 
risk culminating into conflicts of interest and the principal must implement appropriate 
control mechanisms (“mechanism design”) in order to manage these agency costs. 
According to the principal-agent theory, in order to reduce moral hazard, adverse selection, 
agency shirking, and agency slack, principals should practice screening and monitoring 
agents and should provide incentives to agents for not shirking or slacking.14 
The PA Problem in National Security Studies. Because PA analysis was 
developed in the purview of economics and management, the main “unit of analysis is the 
contract.”15  As legally binding contracts do not often exist in illicit or covert relationships 
between states and militias, PA analysis runs into a gray area where control mechanisms 
are harder to implement, the agent’s perceived value of incentives may shift, and thus, 
agents are more difficult to control than, say, a financial manager. According to Byman 
                                                 
9 Valentino Larcinese, “Principal-Agent Relationship,” Encyclopedia of Power (Thousand Oaks: 
SAGE Publications, 2011), 2. 
10 Bengt Holmström, “Moral Hazard and Observability,” The Bell Journal of Economics 10, no. 1 
(1979): 74. 
11 Kathleen Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” The Academy of Management 
Review 14, no. 1 (1989): 61. 
12 Darren G. Hawkins et al., Delegation and Agency in International Organizations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 8. 
13 Darren G. Hawkins et al., 8. 
14 Holmström, “Moral Hazard and Observability,” 74; Sean Gailmard, “Accountability and Principal-
Agent Theory,” The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability, ed. Mark Bovens et al. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2014), 5. 
15 Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” 58. 
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and Kreps, the “motivation that differs most noticeably between licit and illicit forms of 
delegation is that of plausible deniability,” where principals delegate to agents in order to 
avoid accountability for an illegal action.16  Therefore, in the absence of a physical legal 
contract, I studied interactions between Colombia and its illegal paramilitaries to determine 
what mechanisms it used to influence and control illicit agents, and  I determined that arms 
and impunity were the mechanisms of choice in a constrained relationship (see chapter II).  
Pro-Government Militias (PGMs). Schneckener defines pro-government militias 
as “irregular combat units that usually act on behalf of, or are at least tolerated by, a given 
regime.”17 I will cover several variations of PGMs: paramilitaries, civil-defense forces 
(CDFs, also known as self-defense patrols), and vigilante groups. Scholars and journalists 
often use these terms interchangeably and have not yet reached a consensus on typology.18 
PGMs tend to have an amorphous, non-static quality, changing armed group identities for 
authorized or unauthorized reasons.19  For example, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia 
(AUC) is, by name, a self-defense force conglomerate, but has been labeled a paramilitary, 
pro-government militia (PGM), right-wing terrorist group, drug cartel, and a death squad 
at various stages of its existence. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, I use the acronym 
PGM to frame this thesis, but when referring to the groups in the Colombian and Peruvian 
case chapters, I use the terms self-defense groups and paramilitaries, keeping in line with 
prevailing primary sources and security studies literature on those countries. 
Most of the literature focuses on why states delegate to PGMs in low intensity 
conflicts. Identifying the “why factor” is important to gauging the nature of the relationship 
and its constraints on control. The most frequently cited reasons are as follows: First, PGMs 
make a cheap force multiplier, especially when states are weak and do not have reach in 
                                                 
16 Daniel Byman and Sarah E. Kreps, “Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to 
State-Sponsored Terrorism,” International Studies Perspectives 11, no. 1 (2010): 6. 
17 Ulrich Schneckener, “Fragile Statehood, Armed Non-State Actors and Security Governance,” in 
Private Actors and Security Governance, ed. Alan Bryden and Marina Caparini (Geneva: DCAF, 2006), 
25. 
18 Yelena Biberman, “Self-Defense Militias, Death Squads, and State Outsourcing of Violence in India 
and Turkey,” Journal of Strategic Studies (2016): 4. 
19 Paul Staniland, “Militias, Ideology and the State,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 5 (2015): 
772. 
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the greater part of their territory.20  Second, most scholars assert that states delegate 
violence to PGMs in order to maintain plausible deniability for human rights abuses and 
other illegal acts.21 Third, states may delegate security to PGMs as part of a 
counterinsurgency strategy, where PGMs—specifically self-defense forces with 
specialized local knowledge—are useful for intelligence gathering, and isolating and 
protecting villages from the insurgency.22 Fourth, PGMs are more flexible forces, as they 
are less constrained by organizational bureaucracy.23 Nonetheless, the “why factor” 
directly impacts the type of relationship between state and militia. For example, a state that 
delegates human rights abuses to a militia in order to maintain plausible deniability and 
retain conditional aid from the United States would most likely choose a covert and 
unofficial relationship.24  
The literature also considers how the nature of the relationship influences 
mechanism design. There are several ways to define a relationship between a state and a 
pro-government militia: covert, overt, semi-official, or informal (Carey et al. use two types: 
semi-official and informal).25  The type of relationship between the state and the armed 
group is important as it denotes the level of public accountability that the state has for the 
armed group’s actions or the level of deniability it may have if the relationship is illicit and 
covert. For example, sponsorship of a PGM for intelligence collection and village 
protection in a counterinsurgency effort would most likely merit an overt relationship, 
meaning the government has more leeway in how it designs control mechanisms.26  
Moreover, states may have more difficulty applying control mechanisms to covert groups 
                                                 
20 Carey and Mitchell, “Pro-Government Militias in Armed Conflict,” 7. 
21 Bruce B. Campbell and Arthur D. Brenner, Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with 
Deniability (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
22 Goran Peic, “Civilian Defense Forces, State Capacity, and Government Victory in 
Counterinsurgency Wars,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37, no. 2 (2013): 165. 
23 Carey and Mitchell, “Pro-Government Militias in Armed Conflict,” 8. 
24 Ariel I. Ahram, “Pro-Government Militias and the Repertoires of Illicit State Violence,” Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 39, no. 3 (2016): 219. 
25 Carey et al., “States, the Security Sector, and the Monopoly of Violence: A New Database on Pro-
Government Militias,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 2 (2013): 249. 
26 Carey and Mitchell, “Pro-Government Militias,” Annual Review of Political Science 20, (2017): 12. 
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for fear of exposing their involvement in the group’s activities, and due to a higher level of 
group autonomy.27 
Literature Review. A small, but growing body of literature exists that analyzes the 
relationship between states and PGMs using PA analysis. The majority of these works seek 
to address the question of why, and in what context, states delegate security or violence to 
PGMs and their functional role in unconventional warfare. Several works also focus on the 
link between militias and human rights violations as a form of moral hazard. Several 
authors identify the most common problems that can arise from states delegating to PGMs 
(moral hazard, adverse selection, conflict of interest, etc.), but do not spend a lot of time 
exploring the question of how states seek to prevent or manage these problems. Overall, 
very few works focus on the question of how states delegate to and control their agents 
(mechanism design) or what external factors impede their ability to control their agents. 
Nonetheless, the literature broadly suggests that states use the main control mechanisms 
presented by PA theory: monitoring, screening, rewards, and sanctions.28  The literature 
also maintains that autonomy and control have a negative relationship. In my thesis, I argue 
that governments must apply a tailored combination of these control mechanisms to reduce 
the PA problem. 
Close monitoring is the first commonly suggested control mechanism in the PGM 
literature. Placing PGMs (specifically CDFs) under military and police leadership, and thus 
increasing monitoring, is an effective way to maintain control and reduce shirking or 
agency slack.29 Semi-official and overt ties to the government also facilitate easier 
monitoring of agents. Carey et al. draw a correlation between relationship type and control; 
overt and semi-official relationships correlate with higher monitoring and control, while 
covert and non-official relationships correlate with lower monitoring and control.30 Of 
note, a state’s decision on whether to have a semi-official, overt relationship versus an 
                                                 
27 Byman and Kreps, “Agents of Destruction? Applying Principal-Agent Analysis to State-Sponsored 
Terrorism,” 26. 
28 Hawkins et al., Delegation and Agency in International Organizations, 26-30. 
29 Biberman discusses monitoring State monitoring of secret paramilitary, JITEM, in Turkey. “Self-
Defense Militias, Death Squads, and State Outsourcing of Violence in India and Turkey,” 20.  
30 Carey and Mitchell, “Pro-Government Militias,” 14. 
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unofficial, covert relationship may result from external constraints. Conditional aid from a 
democratic patron such as the United States, or international pressure from an IGO, could 
influence states to deny involvement with militias, while still using them to achieve their 
end game in a counterinsurgency.31  
A fourth suggested hypothesis asserts that states may implement a robust sanction-
reward system to control militias, otherwise known as the carrot and stick approach. For 
example, according to Peic, in the Guatemala Civil War, where 20% of self-defense forces 
collaborated with the enemy, “infiltration by insurgents and covert defection are ever-
present risks of Civil Defense Force deployment.”32 Since CDFs are formed to protect 
villages from insurgents, they may be composed of civilians who are not necessarily loyal 
to either side and therefore will entertain both sides in order to play it safe when either the 
army or the guerrillas arrive at their doorstep. Peic finds that CDFs that are underpaid and 
undertrained may be more likely to shirk and give information to the insurgents.33 
Moreover, without economic incentives, militias may seek other sources of income by 
changing sides or engaging in economic opportunism (drugs, arms dealing, etc.).34  
Connable and Libicki, on the other hand, play with the notion that unpaid, part time militias 
may be more dependable than paid, full-time militias: “since the paid militia members are 
primarily motivated by money, they are also more vulnerable to infiltration, bribery, 
desertion, and defection.”35 
The problem of shirking by Guatemalan CDF’s also suggests that states should 
more carefully vet militia leadership. Screening or vetting agents is a commonly cited way 
that governments can lower risk of adverse selection. Understanding the agent’s priorities 
(economic, ideological, etc.) can help states determine which incentives or rewards and 
which sanctions they should choose to apply to their agents. Information gathering also 
                                                 
31 Carey and Mitchell, “Pro-Government Militias,” 14. 
32 Peic, “Civilian Defense Forces, State Capacity, and Government Victory in Counterinsurgency 
Wars,” 178. 
33 Peic, 177. 
34 Peic, 177. 
35 Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, How Insurgencies End, MG-965-MCIA (Santa Monica, CA: 
Rand, 2010), 148. 
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allows principals to ensure that agents do not have conflicting ideological or strategic 
interests. In some cases, states may also want to choose agents with a similar demographic 
(social, ethnic or religious background) depending on the nature of the conflict.36  For 
example, Stanton observes patterns indicating that militia members are less likely to follow 
state orders to kill insurgents or noncombatants from their same demographic 
background.37 
The most widely accepted and most basic assumption is that autonomy and control 
have a negative relationship. For example, Peic draws a connection between level of 
autonomy and frequency in shirking; the more autonomous the PGM, the less control a 
government has over their actions.38  Similarly, Stanton reveals that data from all civil wars 
between 1989 and 2010 show that the level of autonomy and control are inversely related.39  
Carey and Mitchell also consider the autonomy-control hypothesis as key; “the more 
loosely connected the group is to the state, the more likely it is that PGM members use 
violence for their own benefit, for example to loot or to settle private disputes.”40 Overall, 
the literature concurs that more autonomy reduces state control, and, as a result increases 
the likelihood of a militia’s goals and interests diverging from those of the state.    
Next, state capacity ties in with several hypotheses as weak states with fewer 
resources may have a difficult time designing and implementing control mechanisms such 
as vetting, training, monitoring, and a robust sanction-reward system.41 However, 
Staniland suggests that capacity may have a limited impact on a state’s ability to control 
its agents due to factors outside of the state’s control: “The politics of coercive deployment 
and restraint may be more important than raw state capacity.”42 Böhmelt and Clayton even 
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argue that state capacity is not crucial to sustaining PGMs.43 Nonetheless, I determined in 
my examination of the Colombia and Peru cases that state capacity has a long-term impact, 
as at least some resources are necessary to implement “coercive deployment and restraint.”  
Lastly, some authors assert that states may use no control mechanisms at all. For 
example, Mitchell, Carey, and Butler identify plausible deniability for accountability 
avoidance and outsourcing of violence in relationships as the most logical reason for why 
states would sacrifice part of their monopoly on violence to PGMs. The authors assert that 
states either “can’t control or won’t control” their agents.44 “If challenged by other state or 
non-state actors, they can claim a simple agency problem and lack of control, passing the 
costs to the ‘out of control’ or ‘bad apple’ agents.”45  In other words, governments may 
find that the strategic benefits of yielding control outweigh the costs. The possibility that 
some governments do not have the capacity or resolve to control their agents may indicate 
that they are willing to absorb serious risk in entering relationships with these groups.  
The PA Problem and other non-state actors. Literature on relationships between 
states and terror groups, or rebel groups in proxy wars, also yield valuable insight on 
control mechanisms. For example, Byman and Kreps discuss how states attempt to control 
sponsored terror groups and how the nature (covert or overt) of the relationship affects their 
ability to maintain positive control.46 Similarly, Salehyan examines the relationship 
between foreign sponsors and rebel groups in proxy wars. The authors list “modifying 
scope of authority” to the agent, monitoring and reporting behavior, ex-ante information 
gathering (screening), and a sanction/reward system as the primary mechanisms that states 
have used to control agents.47 Each mechanism has a variation depending on the nature of 
the relationship between principal and agent. Salehyan notes that “principals walk a fine 
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line between empowering rebels enough to ensure that they can impose costs on the target 
government, but not so much that the rebels do not fear abandonment, nor be able to turn 
against the patron.”48 In sum, relationships between states and terrorist, or rebel 
organizations, are similar to relationships between states and PGMs due to the challenges 
of the illicit nature to managing the principal-agent problem. 
Hypothesis. For my hypothesis, I tested the classic principal-agent theory control 
mechanisms: screening, monitoring, sanctions and incentives/rewards.49 These 
mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and states should use them in a tailored 
combination at varying degrees. Moreover, the incentives should come from the state, not 
private actors, like landowners or businesses—I learned that when the Colombian military 
permitted private funding of militias, it soon lost control thereafter. These mechanisms are 
also very difficult to implement when a country has low state capacity. As soon as a state 
is able, it should incorporate a militia into its security apparatus and take away the militia’s 
autonomy. 
• Screening: If a state uses screening in order to weed out criminals and 
determine if the PGM has compatible interests and ideology, it may reduce 
the chance of adverse selection and future conflicts of interest, thereby 
increasing its ability to influence the PGM leadership.   
• Monitoring: If a state monitors its agent, it may reduce the chances of 
moral hazard, shirking, slack, and asymmetric information; and, the state 
may more quickly and effectively apply sanctions or rewards when 
necessary. Moreover, monitoring prevents the militia from becoming too 
autonomous, especially in hard-to-reach geographical areas. 
• Sanctions: If the state applies sanctions when the PGM engages in 
shirking and slacking, one of three outcomes may occur: A) the sanctions 
could backfire and the PGM could seek other means of support or turn 
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against the state. B) The sanctions could have no effect at all. C) The 
sanctions will coerce the PGM to submit to the state.  
• Rewards: If the state uses material incentives or rewards, the PGM may 
be less likely to seek economic opportunities elsewhere.   Conversely, 
material incentives may be ineffective if the militia discovers a better 
source of support elsewhere, such as the drug trade or another criminal 
enterprise. Monetary incentives have little effect in a narco environment. 
• State capacity has an exogenous effect on control. If a state has limited 
military and government capacity, and is not present in certain geographic 
areas to monitor militia activities, or is unable to produce incentives for a 
period of time, the militias could obtain more autonomy, which could also 
decrease the state’s future ability to resume applying control mechanisms 
such as rewards and sanctions.   
In examining the above, I took into consideration the relationship type, which is a 
policy choice that has important implications for control. PGMs in a semi-official 
relationship with the state generally have more oversight from military or police than their 
counterparts in informal relationships, and therefore lower autonomy.50 Part of this has to 
do with public accountability; if the state has announced their semi-official relationship 
with the PGM, it may be more motivated to enforce control mechanisms.51  Moreover, it 
is difficult for a state to apply sanctions to a group with which it denies involvement for 
risk of exposing the relationship. The unofficial relationship between Colombia and the 
illegal paramilitaries is illustrative of this point. 
Research Design. I compared case studies from protracted counterinsurgency 
conflicts in Colombia and Peru which have some of the most prolific examples of state 
sponsorship of pro-government militias in Latin America. Table 1 shows the similarities 
and differences between militias in both countries. I built on and updated data from Carey, 
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Mitchell and Lowe’s PGM Database,52  and gave each PGM a ‘level of control’ number 
on a scale of one to five, with five being the highest level of control relative to the other 
cases. This number is an abstract estimate based on the sum of my findings. All militias I 
examined started as civil defense forces in a classic clear-hold counterinsurgency strategy 
during the Cold War and diverged in different directions at various points during the 
conflicts (Table 1). Both states saw marked improvement in state capacity toward the end 
of their conflicts, which enabled them to incorporate self-defense groups as part of their 
armed forces.  
In a detailed analysis of each conflict, I extracted evidence that the state used 
control mechanisms (screening, monitoring, sanctions, rewards) from declassified state 
department memos, declassified intelligence reports, subject country government 
documents, archived interviews, news reports, periodicals, court investigations, truth 
commission reports, and human rights reports. I also measured state capacity by GDP, 
military expenditure, tax revenues (as % of GDP) and level of territorial fragmentation. I 
found archived newspapers and declassified U.S. State Department documents through a 
search (spanning 1964-present for Colombia and 1989-present for Peru) on ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers, ProQuest National Security Archive, ProQuest Congressional, 
George Washington University National Security Archive, and the CIA Electronic Reading 
room. The majority of the Colombian government and truth commission documents and 
historical newspapers were obtained through Google search. Lastly, I referred to books and 
some journal articles for historical background. The non-transparent, and sometimes illicit 
nature of these relationships has meant that primary sources available can be spotty and 
even biased, particularly on the military side. As such, I am aware that I do not have a 
complete picture of all transactions and agreements between principal and agent during the 
protracted conflicts of Colombia and Peru. To fill in some gaps, I drew from quality 
secondary sources, such as particularly useful books and articles by Phillipe Dufort, Mario 
Fumerton, Jacobo Grajales, Maiah Jaskoski, and Julie Mazzei. These authors spent 
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valuable time in the field conducting interviews and gathering data from Peruvian and 
Colombian government archives. 
Table 1.   A comparison of pro-government militias in Colombia and Peru.53 
 
 
Thesis Overview. My thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter II covers 
Colombia’s first Self-Defense Groups and the origin of notorious paramilitaries like MAS 
and the ACCU, and the eventual unification of the AUC. I thoroughly review the main 
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factors for why Colombia lost control of the groups and how they evolved into near para-
state entities. Chapter III covers the Convivirs, which was Colombia’s second failed 
attempt at organizing and controlling PGMs in counterinsurgency. Chapter IV covers 
Colombia’s success case, the Hometown Soldiers, where I argue that incorporation of 
militias into the state’s military reserve forces is the most optimal way to apply control 
mechanisms and minimize the principal-agent problem. Chapter V covers the three phases 
of the Peruvian Rondas Campesinas: the CDCs, DECAS, and CADs. This chapter details 
the consequences of not implementing control mechanisms over the CDCs and DECAS, 
and how the Peruvian military regained control of these wayward militias by changing its 
policies and incorporating them into the armed forces as auxiliaries. For each individual 
case study, I give a short background on each state’s pro-government militia. In Chapter 




II. COLOMBIA’S FIRST SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS 
The history of self-defense groups in Colombia is long and complex but it is 
necessary to start at Colombia’s first counterinsurgency operation in 1964 in order to 
understand the major factors that molded the self-defense forces into monolithic 
paramilitaries like the Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá (ACCU) and later, 
unified them under the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). In this chapter, I argue 
that two causal factors constrained the military’s ability to implement control mechanisms 
and caused the military to lose control of civilian self-defense groups: privatization and 
criminalization. First, the military’s decision to privatize, and contract out, the 
organization, funding, and operation of self-defense forces to private stake holders (such 
as cattle ranchers and emerald miners) removed the self-defense groups from the military’s 
direct sphere of influence and into the sphere of private patrons.   At the beginning of the 
war, only the military was authorized to organize, train, supply, and deploy self-defense 
forces as a means of maintaining control over their actions. After privatizing this role, the 
relationship dynamics between the military and self-defense forces fundamentally 
changed; the military continued to delegate security roles to the self-defense groups, but 
due to the greater autonomy of these groups, the military had to alter its methods of 
reducing the risk of moral hazard and conflict of interest without having adequate material 
leverage over the groups. The primary incentive it used to manage this relationship was the 
granting of impunity, and the secondary incentive was the supply of arms.  
Second, I argue that legislation banning self-defense groups (by then also known 
as paramilitaries) in 1989, without preliminary or subsequent action to suppress them, 
made these already powerful, entrenched groups more difficult to control by removing 
them from the scope of government authority. The military thus lost whatever legal 
influence it had over the self-defense groups through Law 48 (the law that legalized self-
defense forces in 1968), and missed an opportunity to reverse the damage done by 
privatization. Instead, the expulsion of the self-defense groups into Colombia’s criminal 
space only further opened them up to the influence of drug traffickers, which eventually 
provided them the opportunity to acquire a major stake in Colombia’s drug trafficking 
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revenue. After the government banned the paramilitaries, COIN hardliners in the military 
maintained an unofficial partnership with the paramilitaries, facilitated by their shared 
ideology, kinship, and similar objectives concerning the guerrillas. Under the constraint of 
an illicit relationship, military leaders continued to provide impunity to the paramilitaries 
in exchange for valuable intelligence and assistance in ‘clear-hold’ COIN operations 
(mostly involving human rights violations). Short of resources, and preferring paramilitary 
rule over guerrilla rule, the military resigned itself to allowing the paramilitaries to attrite 
and occupy territory from the guerrillas. However, in its roundabout effort to deny the 
guerrillas territory by giving it to the paramilitaries, the military permitted Colombia to 
become even more fractured. A conflict of interest arose between the government and 
paramilitaries: both were engaged in a war of attrition against the guerrillas, but the 
question remained as to who would control the former guerrilla-held territory and 
eventually lay claim to Colombia’s monopoly on the use of force thereafter. 
Clarification on Terminology and Typology. While this thesis uses the term “pro-
government militias” in the general framing and analysis of the research question and topic, 
as it applies in international security studies, I will use the terms “self-defense groups” 
(autodefensas) and “paramilitaries” in this chapter, keeping in line with the large majority 
of primary and secondary sources on Colombia. Furthermore, even though PGMs in 
Colombia interchange the labels of self-defense forces and paramilitaries, I will use the 
term self-defense forces in reference to the groups founded and generally under the 
auspices of the military as part of a mandated counterinsurgency plan. I will use the term 
paramilitaries primarily in reference to the self-defense groups that attained total autonomy 
from the military, or that organized independently from the military.  
Background. From its establishment in 1830 after the dissolution of Gran 
Colombia, Colombia has experienced a number of lengthy and violent civil wars fought 
between left and right wing political factions, which used private militias to attrite and hold 
territory throughout Colombia’s geographically fragmented landscape. Self-defense 
groups and private armies have a long history in Colombia, playing key roles in Colombia’s 
many internal conflicts. During the period of La Violencia (1948-1958), Colombia’s 
Liberal and Conservative parties waged self-defense forces and private armies against one 
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another and against communist guerrillas.54  After La Violencia came to an end, the two 
parties established the National Front, a 16-year power sharing pact codified in the 
constitution that was meant to bring about peace, avoid the consolidation of a military 
dictatorship, and break out of the cycle of interparty conflict.55  Yet, by the time the 
National Front formed, a low intensity conflict that would last sixty years was already 
underway.  
In the absence of pluralism and legal representation, excluded political parties, from 
moderate to far left, militarized and consolidated into the Marxist guerrillas that would 
threaten Colombia’s stability for decades. According to Clemencia-Ramirez, “Although 
the National Front had opened a democratic space for the two political parties, it precluded 
alternative political expression, relied on a state of siege to maintain public order and 
developed more sophisticated mechanisms of repression and terror…Communist leaders 
wanted their party to be able to participate in government, but the Liberal and Conservative 
leadership neither supported nor recognized their repeated appeals.”56 Cold War 
geopolitical and U.S. hemispheric pressures also played a large part in the left’s exile from 
the political forum. Consequently, the exclusionary effects of the National Front and Cold 
War geopolitical pressures collided with the rise of the Cold War era’s leftist movements. 
In the 1960s, Colombia faced many of the same Cold War challenges as the 
majority of Latin American countries. Fueled by inspiration from the 1959 Cuban 
Revolution, political exclusion and oppression, a preponderance of Marxist rural and urban 
guerrillas organized throughout the continent with the intention of fomenting revolution, 
often with Cuban or Soviet support. Latin American Marxist guerrillas found strength in 
purpose from their experiences living in societies that were historically marked by high 
levels of economic and social inequality. Colombia was no different. Yet, even as these 
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conflicts winded down and fizzled out with the end of the Cold War in 1989, the civil war 
in Colombia only escalated, along with the resolve of the two most prolific guerrillas, the 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and Ejército de Liberación 
Nacional (ELN), to achieve military victory. Explaining the causal factors for why 
Colombia’s conflict lasted long past its expiration date is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but two contributing factors were as follows: First, Colombia had a perpetually weak state 
with “the most dispersed population in Latin America and one of the highest indices of 
geographical fragmentation in the world.”57 The absence of the Colombian state in the 
greater part of its territory enabled the guerrillas to establish control in remote mountain 
and jungle regions, further weakening the Colombian state. Second, guerrillas were able to 
continue operating in remote jungles without external support through the income produced 
by drug trafficking. Thus, without a monopoly on its own territory, the weak and corrupt 
Colombian government was unable to eliminate the guerrillas.   
The first Self-Defense Groups under Plan Lazo in the 1960s. From 1962 to 1966, 
Colombia conducted COIN operations under the US-backed Plan Lazo, which aimed to 
“eliminate the principal bandits and the guerrillas controlling ‘independent republics.’”58 
Plan Lazo incorporated progressive social justice and economic reforms, civic action 
programs and the use of civilian self-defense forces in a “clear-hold-build” strategy to 
defend areas cleared by Colombian special forces and provide intelligence to security 
forces.59  The delegation of rural security to self-defense committees was not a new concept 
in Colombia, but it was re-articulated in the spirit of Cold War-era National Security 
Doctrine and COIN strategy inspired by U.S. Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 31–
16) and subsequent Colombian COIN handbooks such as the Reglemento de Combate de 
Contraguerrillas (EJC-3-10, 1969, 1981, 1987, and 1989). Most importantly, “the 
intelligence (E-2) section of Plan Lazo “included precise guidelines on how to create, 
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organize and structure civilian self-defense forces for security and territorial control: 
squads at the company level, platoons at the battalion level, and mixed units at brigade 
level.”60 
While initially encompassing a whole-of-government package, Plan Lazo evolved 
into a military-centric COIN plan. According to Maullin, who wrote an analysis on Plan 
Lazo in a 1971 RAND publication, “its record of achievement…is ambiguous…on the 
other hand, many of the most notorious bandit and guerrilla groups were eliminated under 
Plan Lazo, and the government authority was brought to many areas where it had not been 
in evidence for many years.”61 However, while the military played its integrated civic 
action and kinetic roles well, civilian government elites were either unable or unwilling to 
execute their part of the civic action plan and enact the prescribed socio-economic 
reforms.62 After the failure of the Colombian government to execute the necessary reforms, 
the military, stinging from a lack of interagency cooperation by political elites, and waning 
human and material resources, placed a greater emphasis on more hardline strategies and 
kinetic aspects of Plan Lazo, particularly the mobilization and expansion of civilian self-
defense forces and the civilian informant network.63   
In 1965, President Valencia legalized self-defense groups through Decree 3398, 
which created a “regulatory legal instrument for its national defense” by redefining it as 
“the organization and tasking of all the residents and resources of the country, from time 
of peace, to guarantee national independence and institutional stability.”64 Decree 3398 
was then codified into law in 1968 with the passing of Law 48. Four key articles in Law 
48 stand out: Articles 23, 24, 25 and 33. Articles 23, and 24 of the decree stated that “all 
Colombians are obliged to participate actively in national defense,” and “participation in 
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civil defense is permanent and obligatory for all inhabitants of the country.”65    Article 25 
declared that “all Colombians, men and women, not included in the call to compulsory 
service, may be used by the Government in activities and work with which they contribute 
to the restoration of normalcy.”66 Article 33 permitted the arming of civilians by stating 
that “the Ministry of Defense could grant as private property, weapons that are considered 
for the exclusive use of the armed forces.”67  Overall, Decree 3398 and Law 48 established 
a legal foundation and justification for the formation of self-defense groups (and 
unfortunately, criminal organizations in the guise of self-defense groups) for the duration 
of the 60-year conflict.68   
While Law 48 legalized self-defense forces, the Reglemento de Combate de 
Contraguerrillas (EJC-3-10) constituted the guiding military principles for the 
organization, management, and employment of self-defense forces for the large part of the 
Colombian Conflict. Human rights organizations consider this manual as a foundational 
document and evidence against the military for Colombia’s paramilitary phenomenon. 
However, the EJC 3–10 is fairly typical of the COIN doctrine of the time and is not 
particularly extraordinary. Inspired by the U.S. Army COIN field manuals, the manual 
prescribes the organization of “boards of self-defense,” to be “composed of civilian 
personnel selected from the combat zone, which is trained and equipped to develop actions 
against groups of guerrilleros who threaten the area or to operate in co-ordination with 
troops in actions of combat.”69  The manual includes a directive that these self-defense 
committees (juntas de autodefensa) should be “controlled by the military 
command…[and]… dependent on the military at all times.”70 Moreover, it requires that 
military officers select, organize, train, arm and equip the civilians. Of note, the manual 
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recommends placing loyal reserve officers in the role of junta leaders, and providing them 
with combat, tactical, and defensive training.71  Subsequent field manuals, like the 1982 
Manual de Combate Contra Bandoleros o Guerrilleros (EJC-3-101) provided similar 
guidance. 
In accordance with COIN doctrine, the self-defense groups mostly remained under 
the auspices of the military in the decades of the 1960s and 1970s. There is very little 
detailed information available on the activity of the self-defense forces in the 1970s, 
mechanisms used to control them, and the overall counterinsurgency effort due to the fact 
that during this decade, “the civil defense in Colombia kept a low profile with the 
conventional counterinsurgency and national security doctrines espoused by the 
Colombian military.”72  Nonetheless, Colombian intelligence (including Colombia’s FBI 
equivalent, the DAS, and the BINCI-Charry Solano Battalion) and the military were 
charged with monitoring and controlling the self-defense groups.73 For example, the 
military established expansive communications nets (organized under “federations”) to 
communicate with the groups. “Communications and civil defense early warning networks 
played an important role in linking these autodefensa units to security forces…At the 
department level, the Colombian government established rural civil defense early warning 
radio nets with local community support.”74 Another method for monitoring involved the 
use of counterintelligence agents to root out disloyal members. The 1979 COIN Manual, 
Instrucciones Generales para operations de Contra-Guerrillas (EJC-3-101), prescribed 
the use of plain clothes agents disguised as guerrillas sent to test the loyalty of individual 
self-defense members. Those who failed the test, or whose loyalties were suspect, received 
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threats in the form of handwritten notes meant to frighten them into fleeing the area.75  
Lastly, the military used some material incentives to keep the self-defense groups in line. 
According to the 1982 EJC-3-101, the self-defense groups’ “collaboration and efforts are 
rewarded with ammunition for revolver and shotgun, dynamite, safe conduct, sporadic 
military patrols or protection in their regions, drugs, better treatment, enthusiasm, and 
acceptance of their initiatives.”76 Even after the self-defense groups were banned in 1989, 
the military would continue to use weapons and ammunition as an incentive when 
delegating counter guerrilla operations to the more advanced paramilitaries.  
In a testimony to the Court of Justice and Peace during an investigation into an 
alleged paramilitary member, Colombian Army Colonel Carlos Alfonso Velázquez 
Romero described how a typical self-defense group in the 1960s and 1970s operated: 
The farmers were organized into brigades or battalions and were trained to 
wield rifles, the highest caliber gun they could use was a rifle, because there 
were no machineguns, or submachine guns…Many times, I remember, 
those rifles were returned to the public to help in the formation of a first ring 
of security in case of guerrilla incursions in populations that did not have 
police or where police were limited to 2 or 3 agents. Then, the army would 
also send a sergeant, a lieutenant, or a captain, depending on the 
situation…[to manage] the autodefensas. When it was anticipated that the 
guerrilla was to arrive, alerted by the sound of a horn or church bell, 
whichever sign was agreed upon, these people would arrive and would 
position themselves into key sites to dissuade the entry of the guerrilla or at 
least shoot at them, after which they would call the nearest army or police 
unit.  The augmenting police force would then [arrive to] support the 
autodefensa units while they fought off the guerilla.  They were created and 
they functioned that way for a while until the 80’s when more autodefensas 
were created in Magdalena Medio.77 
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Privatization. During the 1970s, the military also started engaging in practices that 
gradually privatized the management, funding and eventual organization of the self-
defense groups, leading to their loss of authority and control over their activities. The 
civilian government institutions failed to support Plan Lazo and subsequent COIN 
campaigns in the 1970s, resulting in the military feeling marginalized and isolated as sole 
executors of the counterinsurgency campaign.78 A detailed account of why this occurred is 
part of a complex civil-military affairs problem and beyond the scope of this paper, but the 
basic narrative is that the military was losing government support in the counterinsurgency 
campaign while taking an increasingly hardline approach.79  The military operated with 
increased autonomy from the state as they were adding to the numbers of self-defense 
groups in the country (not counting the ones that sprung up independent from the military) 
without constraint or government oversight.80  The military lacked the material resources 
needed to support the growing number of rural self-defense groups. As a result, military 
leaders shifted and expanded the organization and management of the self-defense forces 
into the private realm of the landed and business elite.81 That is, “they opted to mirror 
insurgent irregular strategic behaviors. To do so, the hardliners developed an alternative 
war strategy that focused on the development of large-scale, para-institutional 
militias…[by mobilizing] the private resources of landed regional elites in the war against 
the insurgency.”82 This brings to mind a fundamental Maoist tenet directing guerrillas to 
derive their resources from the people.83 If the military could divert those resources from 
the people to their self-defense forces instead of the guerrillas, they could deprive the 
guerrillas of a major source of income. The results of privatization would come to fruition 
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in the 1980s, when the self-defense groups made a dramatic transformation into 
autonomous mega-paramilitary organizations.  
Privatization of the self-defense groups occurred through the extraction of funding, 
or informal war taxes, from private landholders (ranchers, farmers, etc.) in exchange for 
protection, while the military continued to provide arms to the groups.84   Landowners were 
happy to oblige as paying the self-defense forces for protection was far cheaper than paying 
the guerrillas, which did not even guarantee their safety from future extortion and assault.85 
“Bands of farmers joined forces to protect their land and their families and began providing 
the armed civilian groups with resources beyond the arms provided by the military.”86 In 
the context of countering left-wing insurgency and its strategy of extracting resources from 
the people, this system made sense in that it diverted citizen resources from the guerrillas 
to the pro-government self-defense groups. Unfortunately, however, it produced the 
undesirable result of shifting the self-defense forces from the authority of the military to 
that of private benefactors, essentially handing them private armies, and further degrading 
the Colombian state’s monopoly on the use of force. Thus, a plan that was intended to 
cheaply increase the Colombian state’s presence throughout ungoverned spaces only 
served to further fracture the territory into a feudal system because the military armed these 
civilians, but gradually ceded control over their operations to private actors. According to 
Avant, “Non-state financing of security is most likely to occur when the state has failed to 
provide the desired protection and is thus, in itself an indication of state weakness. Non-
State financing could further weaken the state both in terms of its control of consequential 
incentives and in terms of its coherence and legitimacy.”87  Thus, the military delegated its 
security role to peasant self-defense forces funded by illegitimate war taxes. Ideally, the 
government should have extracted those taxes itself and used them to provide protection 
with legitimate military and police forces.  
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The military’s process of privatization in the 1970s set the stage for the explosion 
in the number of Colombia’s self-defense groups in the 1980s and triggered their 
transformation into autonomous paramilitary organizations. Legally justified by Law 48, 
private actors increasingly founded and organized self-defense forces on their own accord 
due to insufficient state security presence and the need to defend private economic interests 
from the guerrillas and criminal bandits.88 The paramilitaries were further buttressed when 
the “Turbay Ayala government…[in the 1978 security statute] called on the population to 
arm itself.”89 Declassified U.S. State Department and CIA sources indicate that the military 
worked with these privately formed groups much in the same way it worked with the self-
defense groups that it organized under Plan Lazo.90  The military and intelligence agencies 
still held responsibility for overseeing all self-defense groups, regardless of origin, but by 
the late 1980s, their loss of control was readily apparent. For example, a 1987 U.S. 
Embassy cable discussing the Tolima self-defense groups paints a revealing picture of the 
self-defense groups’ increasing level of autonomy (emphasis added):   
POLOFFS emphasized that the boundary between sanctioned self-defense 
groups and violent para-military groups would become blurred over time, 
particularly by foreign human rights groups. Santamaria readily agreed, 
proposed no remedy for the problem, but suggested that local commanders 
would be responsible for policing the self-defense groups. Such control is 
apparently absent in the case of the Tolima groups; liberal Tolima 
congressman Alfonso Lopez told POLOFFS August 4 that Groups active 
in Tolima were autonomous, subject to no oversight…While Colombia’s 
political elite concede that the constitution allows for self-defense groups, 
there is obvious concern about the size, the range of permissible activity, 
the source of arms for, and the control of these groups… Although 
Supporters of Self Defense groups argue that the military can and will 
monitor these groups and prevent their engaging in offensive actions, 
this reasoning appears faulty. Self-defense groups have sprouted in areas 
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were the military is unable to guarantee security. Given the commitments 
of the military in these areas it is unlikely that they can devote sufficient 
resources of the supervision of these groups. Absent effective control, the 
temptation of the self-defense groups to strike against the visible symbol of 
the FARC i.e., the Union Patriotica may prove irresistible.91 
Another mistake the military made that contributed to its loss of control was 
involving the self-defense groups in offensive operations. The acquisition of territory was 
one of the more tangible metrics of power in the conflict, and a “clear and hold” COIN 
strategy maintained that self-defense groups would guard areas “cleansed” and reclaimed 
from the guerrillas. However, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the military started 
involving the self-defense groups in “fumigating” areas of subversives, a term designated 
for the offensive “clear” phase of counterinsurgency operations.92 By delegating both the 
offensive and defensive phases of COIN operations to these privatized self-defense groups, 
the military inadvertently allowed them to seize large portions of land from the guerrillas. 
The concept of clear and hold took on an entirely new dimension in the zero-sum game of 
territorial acquisition; even though the territory was taken from the guerrillas, it was not 
ceded to the state. As the self-defense groups grew extremely adept at offensive operations 
(they even hired mercenaries from Israel and the UK to instruct them in special 
operations93), they were able to conduct clear and hold in their own campaigns independent 
from the military. Through this process, Colombia’s territory became divided up, more or 
less, into fiefdoms under the control of either the state, guerrillas, cartels, or paramilitaries. 
In sum, the clear and hold strategy is meant to retake positive control of territory for the 
state. With self-defense groups guarding the reclaimed territory, the military may 
eventually move on to another area, but only under the condition that the military keeps 
the self-defense groups defensive and dependent on the government. The involvement of 
privatized self-defense groups in offensive operations permitted the transfer of contested 
territory to private actors instead of back to the state. 
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Privatization also set the stage for the attrition of the self-defense groups into the 
criminal sphere of influence. The proliferation of these independently formed groups was 
not limited to the military, cattle ranchers and emerald miners. Drug trafficking 
organizations, like the Medellin Drug Cartel, also saw the utility in self-defense groups to 
protect their interests from guerrillas demanding war taxes and kidnapping relatives. In 
1981, Pablo Escobar and Fidel Castaño, with the help of military officers (in a 1983 
investigation, the Procuraduría exposed the involvement of 59 military officers), formed 
the Muerte a Secuestradores (MAS) paramilitary.94  “The real expansion of the Colombian 
paramilitary came at the beginning of the 1980s with the installation, by powerful drug 
traffickers, of the MAS.”95 In other words, the creation of MAS marked the beginning of 
an era when the self-defense groups became paramilitaries, and the interests of the 
paramilitaries took on a more enterprising nature that did not resemble the original 1968 
mandate from the state.   
Soon after, the Castaño brothers also founded a mega-paramilitary, the ACCU, with 
the support of cattle ranchers in Cordoba and Urabá.  “The ACCU organized a sophisticated 
communication network in the region, linking approximately a thousand cattle ranches and 
plantations, whose administrators became permanent watchmen, reporting to the police, 
the army, and Castaño’s headquarters.”96  The Castaño brothers, who had a personal 
vendetta against the guerrillas after killing their father for failing to pay the full ransom 
payment in time, had originally received training from the military but quickly outgrew 
state sponsorship through a combination of drug trafficking and territorial acquisition from 
clear-hold operations.97 With privatization, the scope of paramilitary operations grew to 
encompass protecting the interests of drug cartels from the guerrillas, who were also 
becoming competitors in drug trafficking. By outsourcing the funding of the self-defense 
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groups to private actors, the military opened the door for future conflicts of interest to arise. 
The self-defense groups were seemingly beholden to two principals: the military, to which 
they answered in terms of COIN and arms provision, and their wealthy civilian benefactors 
and drug traffickers (the “narco bourgeoisie”), who had interests of their own. 
Paramilitaries such as MAS and the ACCU muddied the waters between who was 
principal and who was agent. According to Koonings and Kruijt, the military supported 
MAS and other private paramilitaries “with logistics, organizational expertise and 
hardware such as uniforms and small arms. In exchange, military personnel received 
payments from drug money or money generated by other illicit activities such as emerald 
smuggling.”98  Thus, self-defense groups were no longer subsidiary to the military, but on 
par, or para to the military, hence the use of the term paramilitary. Colonel Velázquez 
Romero roughly sums up this transition: 
[The Narco] figureheads in the Magdalena Medio said…these auto-
defenses have to protect us because here we can’t run the risk of the guerrilla 
being emboldened enough to kidnap us.  Gradually and with the agreement 
of various military members that controlled the autodefenses, who could not 
see, or did not want to see what they were getting themselves into…that it 
was already a corrupt deal, rather a deal that was not in line with why the 
autodefenses were created. These narcos started to pay off and invest in the 
autodefensas and now they not only had rifles provided by the army, but 
also submachine guns, machine guns, revolvers, or 9mm guns bought by 
the narcos…The autodefenses transformed [into paramilitaries] with the 
help of various military members who did not want to see or did not see 
what was coming (or the full weight of the problem).99 
Several scholars consider the formation of MAS as a catalytic event that marked 
the complete loss of control and shift of the self-defense forces from the auspices of the 
military to the auspices of the drug traffickers.100  However, while the creation of MAS, 
and the methods described by Colonel Velázquez Romero above marked the beginning of 
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a new era in which the paramilitaries moved into the criminal sphere of influence, anti-
paramilitary legislation in 1989 finalized this transfer.  
Anti-Paramilitary Legislation. As the paramilitaries multiplied in power and 
number, the level of activities, typically involving human rights abuses, spiked, which 
gained the attention of the media, human rights NGOs and the international community. 
The results of an investigation by the Procuraduría (Inspector General) commissioned by 
President Betancur in 1983 also revealed the extent to which the military was connected 
with criminally linked paramilitary groups like MAS.101  The head of the investigation, 
Procurador Carlos Jiménez Gómez, described the indicted officers as “officials who go 
overboard when faced with the temptation to multiply their ability to act and take advantage 
of private agents, whom they begin to use as ‘guides’ and ‘informants,’ collaborators and 
assistants in general, and whom they end up using as a hidden weapon so that, with this 
plan of hired killers, they can do officiously what they cannot do officially.”102 Yet, the 
Produraduría’s exposure of the military’s use of paramilitaries as an extrajudicial solution 
did not result in meaningful reform, and the proliferation of paramilitaries continued under 
the military’s watch. 
Consequently, in 1989, the government issued a number of decrees with the intent 
of cracking down on the paramilitary problem. Decrees 813, 814, and 815 collectively 
attempted to rein in the paramilitaries. First, Decree 813 established an “advisory 
commission and coordinator of actions against death squads, gangs of hitmen, self-defense 
groups or private justice groups, all mistakenly called paramilitaries.”103 However, “the 
majority of the commission had either voiced support for paramilitary organizations or 
headed institutions that contained sectors with strong relationships with paramilitaries.”104 
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Second, Decree 814 established a thousand-member special police task force to dismantle 
illegal paramilitary groups.105  However, according to Aviles, the task force only received 
assignments that targeted drug labs, without directly taking on the paramilitaries.106 Third, 
Decree 815 declared that only the President, with endorsement from the Ministry of 
Defense, could create and deploy self-defense groups in an “unaggressive,” unarmed 
manner, and suspended Law 48, Article 33, Paragraph 3, which permitted their use of 
restricted weapons in self-defense.107 The introduction of the decree states that “The 
interpretation of [Law 48] by some sectors of public opinion has caused confusion about 
[the self-defense groups’] scope and purpose in the sense that they can be taken as a legal 
authorization to organize armed civil groups that act outside the constitution and laws.”108 
Finally, on May 25, 1989 the state rescinded Law 48 entirely, mandating that all self-
defense groups demobilize and return their weapons to the military.109 The repeal of Law 
48 was followed shortly by Decree 1194, which established criminal penalties for any 
civilian or member of the armed forces or police who promoted, organized, provided 
training for, recruited for, provided support (arms, money, logistics) for or joined a so-
called paramilitary.110   
While the legislation was well intended, it was too little and too late. By 1989, the 
paramilitaries were far too powerful and invested in both the anti-guerrilla conflict and 
private—and often illegal—enterprise for the repeal of Law 48 to have an impact. Second, 
the new legislation did not have any teeth. As highlighted above, the groups had allies in 
defense ministry, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies that made it difficult, if not 
impossible, to carry out the new decrees to effect. Thus, from the point of view of the 
paramilitaries, which had become para-state institutions in their own right, criminalization 
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carried little weight. Mazzei puts it best by asserting that “the local groups had survived 
as…’fiefdoms with armed power’ largely due to the relevance they had and purpose they 
served for local communities…The networks of support, the mobilizing structures, and the 
subjective perceptions of self and reality were all in place when the State rescinded their 
legality.”111  
In that vein, Criminalization is the second major causal factor for the mutation of 
the self-defense groups into nearly para-state forces and it narrowed the military’s options 
for control mechanisms even more than before. The anti-paramilitary/self-defense group 
legislation removed the paramilitaries from the military’s legal COIN apparatus and sealed 
their transition into the criminal domain, further reducing the military’s ability to exert 
organizational controls or even conduct damage control efforts (if it was still possible). The 
legislation only resulted in the increased proliferation of paramilitary groups, “now outside 
of any government control.”112 Moreover, Mazzei makes the valuable point that not only 
was the repeal of Law 48 insufficient to “nullify or invalidate” their collective identifying 
objective of defeating the guerrillas, “the government did not simultaneously act to fill the 
security void that had ‘necessitated’ the autodefensas in the first place.”113 Likewise, 
according to Spencer, “Colombia made the militias that have been operating under army 
auspices illegal in 1989, and the results have been disastrous, namely the uncontrolled 
proliferation of the paramilitaries. Essentially, the government cut off supply of a service 
when it was in high demand.”114  Nonetheless, the military and paramilitaries, now illegal, 
continued business as usual, and they adapted their relationship according to the restraints 
of illegality.  
With the paramilitaries illegal, the nature of the relationship with the military 
changed; the paramilitaries were still a force multiplier and tool of rural defense and 
intelligence reporting, but the military also wielded them as an offensive weapon of 
                                                 
111 Mazzei, Death Squads or Self-Defense Forces?, 91. 
112 Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and its 
Implications for Regional Stability, MR-1339-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 54. 
113 Mazzei, Death Squads or Self-Defense Forces?, 91-92. 
114 David Spencer, Colombia’s Paramilitaries: Criminals or Political Force? (Carlisle, PA: US Army 
War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), 20. 
 34 
plausible deniability. During the period of the 1990s and early 2000s, the military delegated 
operations that violated human rights laws to the paramilitaries.115 The military continued 
to maintain ties with illegal paramilitaries, which aptly earned the nickname of “the Sixth 
Division” in HRW publications. The Sixth Division conducted kinetic COIN operations as 
a shadow branch of the army and performed extra-judicial tasks. According to Aviles, “The 
increasing violations of human rights by paramilitary groups corresponded with a decrease 
in the number of direct violations of human rights committed by the armed forces”116  (see 
Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1.  The inverse relationship between massacres by paramilitaries vs. the 
military and police after Decree 1194.117 
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A covert, illegitimate relationship required new forms of incentives for delegation. 
The incentive of arms and logistics provision was lost its relevance as paramilitaries 
acquired more land and wealth. Furthermore, the destruction of the Medellin Drug Cartel 
in 1993, and the Cali Cartel in 1995 left a power vacuum that provided paramilitaries and 
guerrillas an opportunity to become primary actors in the drug trafficking industry by 
moving into vacated coca-production areas.118 According to Tate, “The fusion of 
counterinsurgency ideology and illegal narcotics revenue produced one of the most lethal 
fighting forces in Latin America.”119 As the paramilitaries grew into a force capable of 
sophisticated counter-guerrilla operations, the military only needed to provide impunity 
and a clear path to receive the desired results: a higher guerrilla body count, and a reduction 
in guerrilla-held territory.120 Even though the paramilitaries had moved into the criminal 
sphere of influence, they still shared strong ideological and personal ties with the military 
(several paramilitaries were retired officers).121  As long as the paramilitaries continued to 
enthusiastically prosecute the guerrillas and attrite guerrilla territory, the military, which 
lacked adequate material and political support from the government, would mostly 
overlook their illegal activities.122   
The paramilitaries’ main incentive for cooperation with Colombian security forces 
was impunity, which included turning a blind eye to paramilitary counter-guerrilla 
operations, at the expense of human rights. There are countless examples of impunity 
recorded by Human rights NGOs, the media, and Colombia’s human rights ombudsman.123 
For example, in a typical situation, the military passed intelligence information to a 
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paramilitary group on the location of suspected guerrillas, and then left the area prior to a 
battle between the paramilitaries and guerrillas, or more often not, before the massacre of 
civilians suspected of guerrilla sympathies.124 The passive act of “looking the other way” 
was well documented, and acknowledged by members of the military.125 One of the most 
notorious examples was the July 1997 massacre at Mapiripán. According to a declassified 
CIA report, prior to the massacre, “the paramilitaries arrived by chartered planes at the San 
Jose del Guaviare airport and apparently were not subjected to identification or cargo 
checks by airport police…Castaño would not have flown forces and weapons in a civilian 
airport known to have a large police presence if he had not had received prior assurances 
that they would be allowed to pass through.”126  When he received reports of the 
paramilitary presence and massacre, the local military base commander did not respond. 
When asked why, he “offered a variety of excuses.”127  
By this system of operations, the military not only did not fight the paramilitaries, 
but became dependent on them to conduct operations that they themselves could not 
conduct. During the 1990s, the Colombian state was too weak and inadequate to fight a 
civil war that for all intents and purposes, the guerrillas appeared to be winning. In 1997, 
the Army estimated “that 431 of the 1,050 or so municipalities in Colombia were controlled 
by guerrillas.”128 Moreover, as is apt to occur in a COIN environment, hardliner COIN 
practitioners in the highest ranks considered their hands inconveniently tied by the 
international human rights standards, rules of engagement, and the slow judicial process. 
While Colombia remained fractured and non-consolidated, the military, with its inadequate 
resources, would not be able to break free of its dependence on the paramilitaries to fight 
                                                 
124 Central Intelligence Agency, “Senior Executive Intelligence Brief,” doc. no. 1122865 (Intelligence 
Report, CIA, 1999), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB166/19990916.pdf. 
125 US Department of Defense, “Cashiered Colonel Talks Freely About the Army He Left Behind” 
(Information Report, Colombia: DoD, 1997), 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB166/19971224.pdf. 
126 Central Intelligence Agency, “Colombia: Update on Links Between Military, Paramilitary Forces,” 
doc. no. 0001413795 (Intelligence Report, CIA, 1997), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/0001413795. 
127 Central Intelligence Agency, “Colombia: Update on Links Between Military, Paramilitary Forces.” 
128 Diana Jean Schemo, “Colombia’s Death-Strewn Democracy,” The New York Times, July 24, 1997, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/24/world/colombia-s-death-strewn-democracy.html. 
 37 
their battle. After nearly 50 years of fighting, the state was still not present in the greater 
part of its territory and did not have adequate military or police forces to extend its reach. 
Thus, even if the military felt equally compelled to fight the paramilitaries, it did not have 
the capacity to do so. A November 1999 State Department cable recorded an officer’s 
reasoning as to why the military did not fight the paramilitaries:  
Asked if his troops would fight the paramilitaries [redacted] said no. “Look, 
I have 100 kilometers of oil pipeline to protect, as well as several bridges 
and the national police…plus there are guerrillas to fight…if you have so 
many tasks to do with so few resources, and you’re faced with two illegal 
armed groups, one which (guerrillas) is shooting at you and the other 
(paramilitaries) is shooting at them, you obviously fight the guerrillas first, 
then worry about paramilitaries.”129  
The paramilitaries’ growing influence was felt most acutely by the Unión Patriótica 
(UP), a political party established in 1985 by the FARC and the Colombian Communist 
party as part of the Betancur peace negotiations. As a “visible symbol of the FARC,”130 
and a key component of the peace talks, the UP was systematically eliminated by the 
paramilitaries in what many scholars consider a genocide.131 By 1997, over 4000 leaders 
were assassinated, including “most of the presidential candidates the party has fielded, 
seven members of the House of Representatives, two senators and thousands of regional 
and municipal office holders. [In 1996], one member was murdered on average of every 
other day.”132  The paramilitaries assassinated UP members, for the most part, with 
impunity, as only four individuals were convicted at trial.133  After losing almost all of its 
members to assassinations, the party was disqualified from the electoral process in 2002 
because it no longer met the popular support requirements to legally remain a recognized 
political party. The press and human rights organizations such as Amnesty International 
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and IACHR accused certain members of the government and security forces of complicity 
in the party’s elimination.134 The paramilitaries succeeded in both eliminating the UP and 
undermining the peace negotiations, which collapsed when the state neglected to act in 
response to the killings (though it publically recognized the problem). The case of the UP 
is an example of moral hazard at the strategic level. It demonstrates how paramilitaries and 
allied factions of the Colombian state could disrupt and undermine executive decision 
makers at the strategic political level.135  
Three important events occurred in the 1990s that would fundamentally alter the 
relationship between the military and paramilitaries: The temporary re-legalization of self-
defense groups through the Convivir program in 1994, the unification of the paramilitaries 
in 1997, and the launching of Plan Colombia in 1999. First, in 1994, President César 
Gaviria passed a law permitting, once again, the formation of self-defense groups to 
provide rural defensive security and pass along intelligence to the military and police. 
These new government-sponsored self-defense groups, called Convivirs, were a strategic 
means of drawing the paramilitaries back into the scope of the state security apparatus. 
Unfortunately, as I will explain in Chapter III, the Convivirs only served to strengthen the 
paramilitaries as independent actors, in turn, further weakening the state.  
Second, the 1997 unification of the paramilitaries under the AUC umbrella group 
marked the transformation of the paramilitaries from separate regional entities with 
regionally focused objectives, to a monolithic national entity with national political and 
strategic objectives and deployable offensive capabilities. In other words, under a unified 
chain of command, the AUC nationalized its operations and commenced deploying units 
across regions as part of a unified plan.136  Its leader, Carlos Castaño (of the ACCU), also 
pursued the objective of taking on a greater political role in Colombia and obtaining a seat 
                                                 
134 “IACHR Takes Case involving Colombia to the Inter-American Court,” IACHR Press Release no. 
055/16, April 27, 2016, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2016/055.asp. 
135 Mazzei, Death Squads or Self-Defense Forces?, 90. 
136 Joint Forces Intelligence Command, “Colombia: AUC Forces Improving Combat Capability” 
(Special Report, JFIC, 2000), https://search.proquest.com/dnsa_cd/docview/1679115835/ 
972C27A3B243482EPQ/ 3?accountid=12702. 
 39 
at the negotiating table with the government and the FARC.137  In addition, he adopted the 
strategic objective of controlling all of northern Colombia, which is where a large part of 
the paramilitaries operated (Figure 2).138  However, the AUC’s focus on wide-range 
political objectives put it into conflict with the state. 
At first, the military worked in tandem with the AUC; some off-duty military 
officers even dawned AUC arm bands while participating in massacres of suspected 
guerrillas.139  However, the relationship became untenable. As a powerful, unified entity, 
the AUC had the capability of influencing the outcome of the peace process by sabotaging 
government efforts with deliberate military action. For example, in early 2001, the AUC 
launched an offensive campaign in Putumayo in reaction to Pastrana’s peace negotiations, 
which included ceding a temporary dispeje, or demilitarized zone to the ELN, similar to a 
much larger one ceded earlier to the FARC in 1998. The AUC reacted to the peace deals 
by “launching a string of massacres,” ramping up its offensive campaign in areas long held 
by the guerrillas, and targeting mostly municipal politicians that were open to accepting a 
peace deal.140  “In open opposition to the Government, in November [2000] the AUC 
paramilitary group kidnapped seven members of Congress and demanded that the 
Government grant the AUC a role in the peace negotiations.”141 
One of the municipalities the AUC took over was the long-held FARC territory of 
Barrancabermeja. “The decision to move into the city in force was prompted by President 
Pastrana’s declaration that he intended to withdraw security forces from an area 30 miles 
to the north as a way to begin peace talks with the ELN. Castaño…opposes the idea of 
giving the ELN a zone of control, saying a similar experiment with the FARC in southern 
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Colombia has failed.”142  The Washington Post noted that the Colombian police held no 
sway in the town, choosing instead to relinquish the rule of law to the paramilitaries. The 
villagers complained that they could not alert the police or military about the paramilitaries 
for fear of later reprisal. Any complaint filed would be filtered from the police back to the 
paramilitaries. “We see them walking together, drinking soda in the stores together, sharing 
their uniforms. There is no way to denounce them.”143  The AUC successfully moved into 
the area designated for the ELN’s despeje.  “When Pastrana withdrew 3,000 soldiers last 
month from the northern zone…[the AUC]…sent its men to replace them, driving the ELN 
back to the foothills...Pastrana must now decide whether to send the Colombian army back 
to drive out the AUC forces…[testing] the army’s willingness to take on the AUC at a time 
when senior officers are openly criticizing Pastrana’s ardent if unsuccessful peace 
efforts.”144  
Whether some members of the military and the government may have morally 
supported the AUC’s actions or not, this episode was a clear example of when the principal-
agent problem goes into crisis mode. Though the military and paramilitaries still shared a 
common enemy, the military could not support an action that went against the strategic 
decision making of a democratically elected government. Under the AUC, the 
paramilitaries were no longer an unofficial division of the military in rural clear-hold 
operations and unsavory death squad activates against suspected guerrillas. Rather, they 
were a para-state opponent that had coopted the fight against the guerrillas in a war of 
attrition.   
Like the guerrillas, the AUC was vying for control of Colombia. In 2000, the 
number of massacres of civilians committed by the AUC had reached an all-time high, 
more than doubling in the previous two years, while in the same period, the number of 
paramilitary organizations in Colombia increased by 58% (see Figures 1 and 2). Like the 
guerrillas, the AUC held the monopoly on power in large swaths of territory, extorting 
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“war-taxes” or protection money from drug cartels and land owners and exerting extra-
judicial rule of law (see Figure 3).145  Moreover, the AUC was gaining public support in 
Colombia, polling at 15% of the population—a much higher rate than the FARC.146 
According to Richani, “Castaño and Mancuso claimed, correctly, that more than 35% of 
the elected congress were supporters of the AUC.”147  The AUC’s sabotage of President 
Andres Pastrana’s peace efforts, countless death threats, assassinations, and massacres of 
politicians, journalists, and human rights workers, labor union leaders, and anyone 
suspected of sympathizing with the left was enough to consider the AUC a terrorist group, 
at least within the borders of Colombia, and the U.S. declared the AUC as a foreign terrorist 
organization on 10 September, 2001.148   
 
Figure 2.  Spike in the number of paramilitaries starting in 1998.149 
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Figure 3.  Approximation of territories held by illegal armed groups (2000).150 
Plan Colombia was the third major development that fundamentally changed the 
relationship dynamic between the military and the paramilitaries. Proposed by Presidents 
Andres Pastrana and Bill Clinton and approved by Congress in 2000, Plan Colombia was 
the most ambitious and expensive military aid package for its time and made Colombia the 
third largest recipient of U.S. Aid in the year 2000.151 Over 75% of the $1.3 billion in aid 
was allocated to improving Colombia’s military and police capabilities with the provision 
of military helicopters and a U.S. advisory team to assist in training two new anti-drug 
battalions.152  Even though the primary objective of Plan Colombia was to halt coca 
production and drug trafficking, the plan had a greater impact on the counterinsurgency 
effort than the counter drug effort. According to Porch, “Plan Colombia…provided the 
critical margin and the incentive that allowed Bogota to rein in the human rights abuses of 
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its intelligence services and military, coordinate and modernize their command structures 
and procedures, upgrade the training weaponry, and mobility of the Colombian forces, and 
go on the offensive against a collection of insurgencies, right-wing paramilitary groups, 
and criminal cartels that threatened to bring Colombia to its knees.”153   
A major concern raised during the U.S. congressional approval process of Plan 
Colombia was the military-paramilitary partnership.154 Now under the watchful eye of 
Uncle Sam, and with an influx of military aid, the Colombian military could, and would, 
no longer work with the paramilitaries as it had in the past. Moreover, improved 
capabilities and professionalization, and the arrests of high ranking officers that had a 
history of colluding with the paramilitaries, allowed the military to take on the guerrillas 
as a more formidable force, and without the help of the AUC. In time, the military 
demonstrated that it was willing to crack down on the AUC; according to Richani, “in 
2003, the paramilitaries suffered 1.54 fatalities per 100 men, up from 1.21 in 2002, in 
skirmishes with the army.”155  Spencer notes as well that “in 1998, approximately 450 
paramilitaries were captured and 60 killed in various operations...[and] in 2000–1, much 
more significant actions were taken against the paramilitaries” including a direct 
confrontation in the Cauca Valley and an office raid in Cordoba.156 
Effectiveness of the Paramilitaries. Analyzing the principal-agent relationship 
involves determining whether the agent delivered the desired results in its assigned role, 
even if it is part of a flawed or unethical tactic, operation or strategy. On the tactical and 
operational levels, the self-defense groups and paramilitaries delivered on their assigned 
role. The military was unable to achieve desired results on its own due to domestic legal 
(captured guerrillas often were released by the judicial system due to lack of evidence) and 
international restraints (ROE and human rights conventions). Moreover, security forces 
could not be everywhere at once. Therefore, the military delegated the “dirty work” of 
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cleansing suspected guerrillas to the paramilitaries. According to a 2001 U.S. State 
Department report, “although human rights violations attributed to the military declined, 
the military’s frustration with its inability to defeat the guerrillas contributed to a jump in 
paramilitary violations”157 (Figure 1). 
The paramilitaries were also effective at weakening the guerrillas by capturing 
guerrilla held territory and its associated income sources (such as cocaine production and 
war taxes). According to Spencer, the paramilitaries can take credit for “forcing the 
guerrillas of the EPL to sue for peace and demobilize…[and]…eradicating guerrilla groups 
from much of the Gulf of Urabá area in Antioquia and…in Cordoba and other parts of the 
country.”158 Moreover, he notes that unlike the guerrillas, the paramilitaries restored a 
sense of law and order and even a degree of economic prosperity in their occupied 
territories. However, all of the paramilitaries’ achievements were at the expense of the 
state. The military and paramilitaries’ shared objective of defeating the guerrillas ended at 
the ‘clear’ phase of a COIN operation and the conflict of interest began at the ‘hold’ phase.  
On the strategic level, the relationship was a disaster for the military in that it greatly 
eroded and undermined the legitimacy of the Colombian state. While the military’s choice 
of incentives fit into the context of the political, legal, and economic restraints for each 
phase of the war, the incentives, at times, were too generous. For example, giving the 
paramilitaries impunity and free reign of re-captured territory permitted them to grow 
exponentially in wealth and power. The military exchanged its monopoly on the use of 
force for bodies to meet a body count quota, a high price to pay for a relatively small job 
that played into a very flawed COIN strategy.159  
Conclusion. The military relinquished control of its agents, the self-defense 
groups, through a process of privatization. Legislation criminalizing the groups made it 
nearly impossible for the military to regain control. The military’s relationship with the 
self-defense groups, and later the paramilitaries, went through several evolutions, and each 
                                                 
157 US Department of State, “Colombia: A Violent Backdrop.” 
158 Spencer, Colombia’s Paramilitaries: Criminals or Political Force?, 8. 
159 US Department of Defense, “Cashiered Colonel Talks Freely About the Army He Left Behind.” 
 45 
iteration required different incentives for delegation. During the 1960s and 70s, the self-
defense groups operated almost entirely under military authority, in accordance with Law 
48, in exchange for weapons and protection from the guerrillas. During the 1980s, through 
a process of private sponsorship permitted by the military, the self-defense groups shifted 
into the purview of the landed elite and drug traffickers. The military continued to provide 
arms and logistical support, but the self-defense groups became the powerful agents of 
private patrons, and their interests were split between COIN and economic opportunism. 
The paramilitaries amassed wealth and territory by executing “clear and hold” operations 
independently of the military and funded their operations through organized crime and drug 
trafficking. Once these paramilitaries accomplished the “hold” phase of the operation, they 
remained in place as de facto para-states, easily rivaling the FARC in dominating large 
swaths of territory and becoming warlord rulers in their own right. During the 1990s, the 
government briefly outlawed self-defense groups, and the paramilitaries completed their 
shift to the criminal domain, leaving the military unable to control them using legal means. 
Their shared right-wing ideology, and professional and kinship ties preserved the 
relationship regardless of legal status. Continuing this relationship in an unofficial and 
illegal capacity, the military delegated offensive operations to the paramilitaries in 
exchange for impunity and the ability to have free reign in newly conquered territories. The 
destruction of the Medellin and Cali Cartels, as well as the Convivir program (see Chapter 
III) turbocharged the growth and ensured the autonomy of the paramilitaries. Once united 
under the AUC, they became a formidable force with national objectives and deployable 
offensive capabilities. In 2001, Plan Colombia and associated pressure from the United 
States forced the military to finally end the relationship. The paramilitaries demobilized in 
2006 under a very forgiving accord, but their institutional frameworks remained relatively 
intact, and some groups, re-christened Bandas Criminales (BACRIMs), continue to operate 
under different names.160 
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III. THE CONVIVIRS 
In 1994, the Colombian Congress approved a new self-defense program: the 
Cooperativas de Vigilancia y Seguridad Rural (Rural Vigilance and Security Cooperatives 
or “Convivir”). The name “Convivir” comes from a Spanish word meaning “to coexist,” 
as Convivir members were ordinary citizens that would “coexist” with their communities, 
standing a vigilant watch and reporting any suspicious activity to the military or police in 
case of guerrilla incursion. As with the self-defense groups of Plan Lazo, the Convivirs 
would consist of armed civilians charged with basic village defense and equipped with a 
light weapon, special radio and call sign to report suspicious activity to the police once the 
military cleared the area of guerrillas and moved on. This was the government’s official 
description of the program in the early stages when the Defense Minister was still trying to 
sell it to the government and the public.161  The program lasted from 1994–1997, ending 
prematurely due to a string of human rights abuses by Convivir members and a loss of 
control and situational awareness by the government over the groups’ activities. 
In theory, three decades of trial and error and lessons learned from working with 
pro-government militias should have increased the probability of success for the Convivirs, 
but the program failed for the following reasons: First, the state neglected to provide 
adequate resources to the Superintendency of Private Security and Surveillance (SVSP), 
the organization specially created to regulate private security organizations and later 
charged with overseeing the Convivirs.162  Second, as with the self-defense groups of the 
1960s-1980s, the state outsourced the groups’ funding to private parties, losing most of its 
leverage over the groups’ decision making. Third, the level of monitoring and screening 
was so low that after the first year of the program, the government could not say how many 
Convivirs were licensed to operate, nor could it account for members who were former 
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paramilitaries, military rejects or had criminal records. By the time the government 
attempted to restructure and later demobilize the Convivirs, the illegal paramilitaries had 
already coopted the groups and their assets, with most members neglecting to return their 
weapons to the state. In this chapter, I will first give a background on the economic and 
political situation in 1990s Colombia. Second, I will discuss the conceptual and legal 
background of the Convivirs. Third, I will review the government’s performance in 
monitoring the groups, vetting group members, and applying sanctions or 
rewards/incentives during the program’s short lifespan. Finally, I will offer an analysis on 
why the government either neglected to or failed to apply control mechanisms. 
The Economic and Political Situation in 1990s Colombia. During the 1990s, 
Colombia was an extremely weak state and near collapse, absent in 56% of its own 
territory.163 During the 1960s-1980s, the guerrillas had made little progress in the war, and 
the conflict ebbed significantly during the Betancur peace talks and ceasefire agreement 
(at which point a demilitarized zone was established) between 1982 and 1987. However, 
the failure of the peace talks and the extermination of the FARC’s political party, the Union 
Patriótica by the cartels and paramilitaries contributed to the end of the cease fire in 
1987.164 In 1989, the FARC lost external support after the fall of the Soviet Union, but was 
able to find alternative revenue sources by intensifying kidnapping efforts and increasing 
its involvement in the drug trafficking enterprise.165 “Nevertheless, the [low] intensity of 
the conflict remained roughly constant until 1994 when it began to accelerate continually 
up through to [the early 2000’s].”166 
Meanwhile, after the takedown of the Medellin and Cali drug cartels in the mid 
1990s, the paramilitaries took advantage of the resulting power vacuum, also becoming 
more deeply involved in drug trafficking. According to the CIA, the paramilitaries were 
quickly “outgrowing” the military, most likely due to “frustration over widespread 
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insecurity caused by the military’s inability to curtail the activities of the guerrilla 
groups,”167 and due to a greater involvement in drug trafficking in the absence of kingpins 
like Pablo Escobar. Most importantly, “1994 represented a turning point for the 
paramilitaries because that was when they first began localized operations against guerrilla 
groups.”168  However, the paramilitaries’ expansion in the 1990s did not just reflect public 
frustration over the security situation, it was a direct consequence of a strategic 
counterinsurgency decision made by the state: the re-legalization and encouragement of 
self-defense groups through the Convivir program. 
Legal Background of the Convivirs. In 1994, the Government of Colombia 
passed Decree 356, authorizing and establishing regulations for “special services of 
surveillance and private security.”169  Decree 356 laid out a much-needed regulatory 
framework for the operation of Colombia’s approximately 700 existing private security 
firms, while also setting the legal groundwork for, once again, permitting the formation of 
new self-defense groups.170 Decree 356 established the Superintendency of Private 
Security and Surveillance (SVSP), an organization responsible for licensing and tracking 
the Convivirs and other private security firms. Decree 356 forbade private security 
organizations from engaging in offensive operations but permitted the use of heavy arms 
in accordance with Decree 2535 (Article 9o), passed the previous year, which outlined 
regulations for citizens’ and private security companies’ use of restricted use weapons in 
self-defense.171  “The creation of Convivir did not involve a new law of decree but was 
merely an SVSP administrative decision that extended the scope of the special security 
services.”172 Subsequently, Decree 356 (Articles 39, 40, and 41) acted as the legal basis for 
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Resolution 368 of April 1995, which officially launched the government sponsored 
Convivir program for use in the military’s counterinsurgency effort.173  
The proposal for the Convivirs received enthusiastic backing from the cattle rancher 
and agricultural associations, but drew criticism from Colombian Minister of Interior 
Horatio Serpa, the press, and human rights NGOs due to its close resemblance to the self-
defense group initiative under Law 48 and concerns that the Convivirs would degenerate 
into paramilitaries and criminal bands resembling the MAS self-defense group.174  After 
much debate, the National Security Council met in December of 1994, and approved the 
Convivir program as part of the so-called “Integrated Rural Security Plan,” which had the 
objective of “restoring public order to those rural regions of country afflicted with guerrilla 
violence and suffering from minimal state security presence.”175  In a press release, the 
government promised that the Convivirs would serve as “defensive intelligence 
collaborators with the police and military,” that the Convivirs would not degenerate into 
paramilitaries or vigilante groups, and that they would only operate under strict government 
supervision.176   
Thus, Congress passed Resolution 368 on the stipulation that the SVSP and other 
intelligence agencies would closely monitor and control the cooperatives. The proposed 
plan and control mechanisms were as follows: First, the Convivirs’ official mandate—as 
disseminated to the public—was to defend rural areas cleared by the Army from guerrilla 
incursion and “inform GOC authorities of unusual activities in affected communities.”177  
Second, the Convivirs were required to obtain a license from the SVSP and renew it every 
two years. The SVSP could revoke or renew the licenses (which expired every two years) 
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at its discretion. Third, each Convivir group was to consist of around 30 individuals, 
“including a leader…selected by the local Army commander.”178 Fourth, as a selling point, 
Defense Minister Fernando Botero promised that surveillance and accountability would 
extend to the civil authorities and even the Catholic Church and community civic bodies 
to help facilitate citizen oversight of the groups.179  This implied that Convivir members’ 
identities would be known to the community and municipal authorities. Fifth, before the 
Convivirs could be organized nationwide, the concept was to be tested in a controlled pilot 
program in just five municipalities closely monitored by the government, which would 
“analyze each aspect in detail and correct any errors that may arise.”180 Unfortunately, there 
is no open source record indicating whether or not the trial period occurred. Lastly, 
according to the U.S. Embassy, “unlike Botero’s original proposal, these groups [were to 
be] unarmed—except in exceptional cases and with the explicit approval of the armed 
forces’ joint staff, and [would] depend primary on communications assets to alert the police 
and military to possible subversive activity.”181 The consensus on whether or not to arm 
the Convivirs changed through the planning process, and sources conflict on what the 
official line was when the program was approved. However, by 1995, at the request of 
Antioquia Governor Alvaro Uribe, the Convivirs received restricted weapons from the 
military,182 which was technically permitted to arm the groups at its discretion in 
accordance with Decree 356 and Decree 2535 (Article Nine).183  Overall, the proposed plan 
and promised control mechanisms helped convince Congress and naysayers to pass 
Resolution 368.   
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Conceptual Background. The program was the brain child of Defense Minister 
Botero, who had the backing of the cattle rancher and agricultural associations and 
Antioquia governor, Álvaro Uribe Vélez, who would later become the political champion 
of the Convivirs.184 Botero drew inspiration from Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori’s 
relatively successful CAD program, Peru’s civil-defense forces in the counterinsurgency 
against the Sendero Luminoso, and he brought in a Peruvian military advisor group to 
consult with the Colombian military on how to implement a similar program. He firmly 
believed that the paramilitaries were an inevitable feature in a weak state with a protracted 
civil war, and that the state could best control paramilitaries inside the law rather than 
outside the law.185 According to Grajales, the big-picture strategy behind the Convivirs 
was to “bring the paramilitaries back into the scope of the state, subjecting them to public 
regulation.”186 El Equipo Nizkor also corroborates his hypothesis, calling the Convivir a 
“legal space of articulation” between the Public Force and the paramilitaries.187 In other 
words, the Convivir program would act as a nucleus to draw the paramilitaries back into 
the general scope of the government’s security apparatus, which would facilitate a process 
of legalization and gradual incorporation. In a sense, the government was trying to reverse 
the damage from the 1989 repeal of Law 48 and subsequent criminalization of the original 
self-defense groups.  
Besides its strategic role as a nucleus for the paramilitaries, the  Convivirs served 
the following purposes:  First, on the operational level, the military used the Convivirs as 
a legal interface to ease intelligence sharing and offensive operations between public 
security forces and the paramilitaries.188  According to Grajales, the Convivir groups acted 
as “screens” e.g. “statutory institutions that transmit information from one side of the legal 
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gap to the other.”189 For example, the military fed intel provided by the Convivirs to the 
paramilitaries when delegating offensive operations.190 Second, and as described in the 
officially disseminated mandate, the Convivirs defended cleared areas from guerrillas and 
notified the security forces about subversive activity. Because the Convivir program was 
highly publicized and meant to be transparent, the relationship between the government 
and the groups was entirely overt, meaning that control measures could be applied 
publically and without the constraints of a covert relationship, unlike with the illegal 
paramilitaries. However, as we will see, this did not occur.  
Overall Execution of Program Oversight. Defense Minister Botero’s promises 
of closely controlled rural security cooperatives did not come to fruition and the Convivirs 
quickly got out of hand. By 1996, the government did not know how many Convivirs were 
in operation, the press estimating the number anywhere between 200–600 groups, a 
majority of which were not licensed.191  “According to the SVSP, the problem was due to 
the fact that many groups started to work with the application for the permit, before the 
SVSP had actually granted it. The SVSP recognized at that time that it did not know how 
many people were part of the ‘Convivir’ even though it was their function to issue 
cards.”192 Statistics on the number of members was just as uncertain; for example, the 
IACHR estimated the number of volunteers at 120,000 men193 and an Associated Press 
Article estimated the number at approximately 300,000 men, mostly concentrated in 
Antioquia.194   
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The issue of control was no better than that of tracking numbers. In a July 1997 off-
the-record conversation, an unnamed Colombian Army officer expressed concern to a U.S. 
Embassy official that the Convivirs were “very difficult to control,” contrary to claims from 
previous government contacts that the Convivirs were fulfilling their legally mandated 
function under strict military supervision.195 The officer indicated that the Ministry of 
Defense was aware of “the potential for Convivirs to devolve into full-fledged 
paramilitaries, though the MOD was reluctant to admit it publically.”196 In 1997, when the 
government was reviewing the constitutionality of the Convivir program, the Director of 
the SVSP, Francisco Bernal Castillo, acknowledged that his agency did not manage the 
Convivirs well or did not manage them at all.197 “POL and DAO officers have on two 
occasions met with individuals who claim that the CONVIVIR (Rural Security and 
Vigilance Cooperatives) are in many cases heavily armed and subject to virtually no 
government control, contrary to GOC propaganda on the groups… [redacted] claim that 
many of these groups are in fact paramilitary groups financed by narcotraffickers.”198  
Because of the controversy surrounding the program from its inception, particularly from 
this apparent lack of oversight, both the press and human rights NGOs tracked the 
Convivirs and were able to disseminate some valuable observations from the field that 
indicated how the government attempted (or did not attempt) to exert control over the 
groups. 
Monitoring. The robust oversight program touted by Botero never materialized 
and the U.S. State Department, CIA and Human Rights NGOs reported that little to no 
monitoring occurred, mainly because the organization charged with monitoring the groups, 
e.g., the SVSP, did not receive enough staff and funding to adequately apply control 
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mechanisms over the Convivirs. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that “although by 
law CONVIVIR licenses should be reviewed every two years, by mid-1997, the SVSP had 
suspended all visits to the field for lack of personnel. At that time, the superintendent 
automatically renewed all licenses for an additional two years, without having even visited 
most associations.”199 According to a 1997 Los Angeles Times Article, the SVSP was 
responsible for monitoring 1,943 private security organizations (including the Convivirs) 
with a workforce of just 18 inspectors. According to the head of the agency, Francisco 
Bernal, “We have the legal instruments [to regulate the Convivir], but we do not have the 
human resources.”200  Bernal went on to say that he stopped issuing licenses due to the 
office’s lack of resources, but Convivirs continued to spring up either independently or 
with blessing from the military and without licenses. Other than low state capacity, it is 
unclear as to why the government provided such inadequate resources to the SVSP, and 
this question warrants further investigation. 
Due to a lack of a cohesive command and control organization, the Convivirs 
defaulted to unofficial chains of command split between the police, military and 
paramilitaries. The military and police did not forward reports of the Convivirs’ status 
beyond their own organizations, and the SVSP seemingly was not involved.201 HRW and 
DDHH (El Equipo Nizkor) detail how the military independently founded several Convivir 
groups without going through the proper channel of obtaining a license from the SVSP and 
that local governments had no situational awareness over how many groups existed or who 
were members of groups in their municipalities.202  “Indeed, elected officials, like mayors, 
are often unaware of who belongs to a CONVIVIR, how and where they operate, if they 
have obtained the proper license, or even if one exists within their jurisdiction.”203  
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Screening. Defense Minister Botero promised that no individual with a criminal 
record would be permitted to join the Convivirs.204 However, the SVSP did not vet 
members according to that standard. Human rights publications point out that known 
paramilitaries joined and even held leadership positions in the Convivirs, often with 
blessing from the military and even the SVSP. According to HRW, “The Superintendency 
has proved unable and even uninterested in preventing known paramilitaries from joining 
CONVIVIRs… Repeatedly, Human Rights Watch was told that only “decent people” 
– gente de bien – would be allowed to join CONVIVIRs. As is clear, however, the 
definition of ‘decent people’ is entirely subjective and is often used in Colombia as a 
euphemism for civilians who support paramilitaries as a way of ‘cleansing’ the country of 
guerrillas.”205 An anonymous judge told The Associated Press that one Convivir was found 
to have twelve members who “had been kicked out of the police for disciplinary 
reasons.”206   
The true screening process most likely occurred informally and drew from a 
network of connections. If Grajales’s hypothesis is true, and the Convivirs were a strategic 
nucleus to draw the paramilitaries back into the scope of the state, then the inclusion of 
known paramilitaries in the Convivirs makes sense. More likely than not, an informal 
selection process occurred between the military and paramilitaries, who had their own 
screening criteria. In a more benign example, a former Convivir member and retired soldier 
told HRW that the Army Fourth Brigade recommended himself and other retired soldiers 
for service in a Convivir.207  In a more serious example, the military and SVSP licensed 
known paramilitary members (some of which were also former military officers, cattle 
ranchers, and banana entrepreneurs) like Luis Carlos Mercado Gutiérrez, Raul Hasbún 
Mendoza, and Salvatore Mancuso to organize Convivirs, which I will detail further 
below.208 
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Rewards/Incentives. Weapons constituted the main form of tangible 
compensation from the Colombian military to the Convivirs. The government did not 
directly fund the groups, but provided supplemental arms, including restricted use weapons 
such as machine guns, rocket launchers, and grenades. An Associated Press article noted 
that members mostly carried handguns, but some carried military grade automatic 
weapons, issued by the Colombian Army.209 An Alternativa article accused the military of 
selling restricted-use offensive weapons (“submachine guns, 9mm pistols, mini-uzis, rifles, 
munitions and other restricted use items”) to Convivirs with known links to paramilitaries 
and narcotraffickers (the U.S. was able to confirm the article’s claims through accounts 
from credible individuals).210 As previously noted, Decree 356 and Decree 2535 permitted 
the military, which controlled most of the arms production and sale in the country, to arm 
the Convivirs with restricted use weapons, giving it a degree of leverage over the 
paramilitaries as the most direct source of arms.211 
As with the self-defense groups of the 1970s and 1980s, the government outsourced 
monetary compensation to local business elites. Officially, Convivir members received a 
salary of approximately $300 per month.212 “Upon obtaining a government license, 
CONVIVIR members contributed a monthly fee, which covered the salaries of CONVIVIR 
employees, equipment, vehicles, and expenditures for office space. Each member bought 
a radio for his or her ranch, which allowed communication with the central office staffed 
twenty-four hours a day by young men hired by the CONVIVIR to monitor radio 
frequencies and patrol the area.”213 However, even though the monthly operating fee was 
meant to provide a minimum wage salary to group members, the local elites (banana 
entrepreneurs, cattle ranchers, etc.) provided the bulk of funding for the Convivirs.214  
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Convivirs also garnished their income by taking a cut of extortion money from large 
international companies like Chiquita Banadex as well as local businesses. The act of 
extortion was part of a larger illegal operation in which paramilitaries established Convivir 
groups as “legal” fronts, or middle men, to extort banana companies for protection money, 
typically three cents per crate.215 In a lengthy report on the Convivirs, the Magistrate of 
Justice and Peace described how several Convivirs in Antioquia simultaneously received 
various types of support from the military, paramilitaries and private elites, seemingly 
answering to three bosses.  “Hasbún indicated that the resources obtained from Convivirs 
in Urabá were financed not only by the self-defense groups but also the military forces 
and…the banana industry.”216  
Sanctions. By 1997, dozens of reports came out detailing human rights abuses 
(torture, murder of alleged guerrilla sympathizers), extortion, vigilantism, social cleansing 
(executing addicts, prostitutes, and petty thieves), and other crimes.217  Convivirs executed 
social delinquents at the request of “third party financiers that demanded an end to common 
crime.”218 Organized crime syndicates obtained Convivir licences while they “in parallel 
carried out hired killings, boleteo, drug trafficking, extortion, surveillance of drug 
trafficking networks from laboratories to speedboat exits…”219 By years end, “Convivirs 
had been linked to at least 35 criminal investigations,” but, only two Convivirs were shut 
down for alleged human rights abuses.220 While there are a few scattered reports of 
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Convivir members being arrested for murder of civilians, “like other perpetrators of 
political violence in Colombia, CONVIVIR members implicated in abuses have largely 
gone uninvestigated and unpunished.”221 Moreover, the SVSP did not have the available 
staff or resources to review records of Convivir members accused of human rights 
abuses.222  For the most part, the Convivirs enjoyed the same impunity as the paramilitaries, 
from which they were virtually indistinguishable.  
Due to the string of abuses and crimes allegedly committed by the Convivirs, in 
October 1997, the Colombian Constitutional Court reviewed the controversial and 
basically non-transparent program and decided in a 5–4 vote that the groups were still 
constitutional but over-armed. The court mandated that the groups would have 48 hours to 
return restricted-use weapons to the military, retaining only pistols and radios.223 It also 
passed Resolution 7164, which amended Resolution 368. In Resolution 7164, the Court 
determined that local magistrates should be made aware of the identities of Convivir 
members in their jurisdiction. The groups could no longer operate under the name 
“Convivir,” or collect intelligence, and they were resigned to a purely defensive and benign 
‘neighborhood watch’ role.224  According to a State Department analysis, part of the logic 
in keeping the Convivirs constitutional, despite the bad reputation and lack of management 
over the program, was to prevent the groups from going “underground to join the illegal 
paramilitaries.”225  Moreover, the Convivirs enjoyed the unwavering support of the landed 
and business elite, including that of Antioquia’s governor, future president Alvaro Uribe.    
Disarmament did not go as planned. Out of the thousands of restricted use weapons 
issued to the Convivirs, only 237 weapons were reported returned after the issuance of 
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Resolution 7164.226 In 1998, the SVSP began revoking licenses of groups that failed to 
return their restricted-use weapons. The paramilitaries subsequently absorbed the de-
licensed groups.227  Unfortunately, the government did not enforce Resolution 7164, and 
the Convivirs continued to work with the paramilitaries until the program was shut down 
in 1998, after which the remaining Convivirs went underground and were absorbed into 
the paramilitaries. 
Intelligence Collection and Reporting: An Assessment of Performance. The 
Convivirs were officially mandated to report suspicious activity to the military and police 
who eventually came to depend on the them as their “eyes and ears” in the rural areas.228  
For all intents and purposes, the Convivirs delivered in their intelligence reporting role, 
forming a network of around 30,000 members. This aspect of the Convivirs was perhaps 
the most successful, and the reason that President Uribe created his own version of the 
program (the “Hometown Soldiers”) in 2002. According to the IACHR, “the CONVIVIR 
clearly identif[ied] their mission with the counter-insurgency objectives of the Military 
forces,” and they delivered intelligence accordingly.229 According to a Semana article, 
during just one week in November of 1995, intelligence provided by Convivirs resulted in 
the delivery of 75 EPL and FARC guerrillas, the death of brutal ELN Commander ‘Juan 
Pablo,’ and the death of four other subversives. “Close coordination between the Public 
Force, the government and citizens has resulted in the capture of more than 300 people and 
a new environment has begun to breathe.”230 
A leaked tasking memo from the Army Fourth Brigade to a Convivir in Antioquia 
demonstrated that some Military commanders’ expectations for the Convivirs’ capacity to 
collect intelligence went well beyond that of a group of civilians observing and reporting 
signs of guerrilla activity via radio. The memo instructed the Convivir members to 
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send the army lists of local candidates, including their political affiliations, 
degree of acceptance among the people, their sympathies toward democratic 
institutions, government and military forces, and what degree of local 
influence they wield. The memorandum indicated that ‘narcoterrorists’ of 
the FARC and ELN are carrying out a campaign of intimidation…to impede 
the October 26 electoral process. ‘For that reason,’ said the Memo, ‘it is 
required that the Convivir associations give maximum effort to finding 
information in order to neutralize and/or impede the efforts of the 
subversive cartels.’ The circular also asked the Convivirs for information 
on the capacity of local guerrilla groups to damage elections, analysis of the 
most vulnerable points in public forces protection of the elections, and 
suggestions to guarantee a normal election process.231 
In other words, the Fourth Brigade not only expected the Convivirs to spy on local 
politicians and look for undue influence by subversive elements, it also expected the rural 
cooperatives to conduct a detailed intelligence analysis and course of action 
recommendation based off of what they found. This story is indicative of the expectations 
that the military projected onto the Convivirs, which became a relatively sophisticated 
intelligence network that provided useful information to both the military and 
paramilitaries for planning offensive operations against the guerrillas and suspected 
sympathizers.   
The Military-Convivir-Paramilitary Nexus. Though the government advertised 
the Convivirs as totally separate entities from the paramilitaries, they quickly became 
enmeshed with the paramilitaries, with several members belonging simultaneously to both 
groups. An analysis by the Magistrates of Justice and Peace, declares that the creation of 
the Convivirs “was carried out with the objective of supporting paramilitary groups, 
although with legal overtones only on paper.”232  While that statement may be true, the 
Convivirs also fulfilled two functions; the official COIN function of community self-
defense and intelligence reporting and an unofficial function of providing a conduit 
between the military and illegal paramilitaries, as hypothesized by Grajales. Like the self-
defense groups of the 1960s-1980s, not all Convivirs were the same; some groups were 
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founded by the military or landed elites, others were directly founded and, or supported by 
paramilitaries. In Urabá, the paramilitaries and associated Convivirs operated in a unified 
command and control organization, seemingly without apparent attempts by the state 
agencies charged with oversight agencies to disrupt the relationship.233 The Magistrates of 
Justice and Peace in Bogota found in an examination of registration records that several of 
the Convivirs were organized and led by notorious paramilitary leaders such as Salvatore 
Moncuso and Ignacio Roldan Perez “Monocleche.”234 A list of eleven legally licensed 
Antioquia Convivirs commanded by known criminals and paramilitaries is especially 
revealing.235  In April 1997, the U.S. State Department cited a Revista Alternativa article—
evaluated as credible—arguing that the Convivirs had evolved into a mere legal cover for 
the existing paramilitaries.236 The slew of human rights violations by Convivirs with 
known paramilitary connections fueled media speculation that the Convivir program was 
nothing more than a legal front for paramilitaries to conduct business as usual with 
continued (and more blatant) support from the military and police.  
Botero’s strategy to use the Convivirs to draw the paramilitaries back into the fold 
of the state backfired. Instead, the Convivirs were drawn into the orbit of the paramilitaries. 
A lack of support for the SVSP and a lack of effort in enforcing control mechanisms 
ensured that government resigned control of the Convivirs to the paramilitaries barely 
before the program was off the ground. Moreover, the government also failed to regain 
control of, and reintegrate the paramilitaries (even the ones that took on the façade of 
Convivirs) into the Colombian security apparatus. As a result, the still illegal paramilitaries 
grew in strength and numbers. According to Ronderos, “Castaño took advantage of the 
government’s weakness and the special autonomy of high-ranking military officers in order 
to expand [the paramilitaries’] territorial power.”237 During an investigation into 
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paramilitary activities for the trial of a notorious paramilitary leader, the Court for the 
Magistrates of Justice and Peace questioned why the state did not implement control and 
surveillance mechanisms over the Convivirs in the 1990s. “According to the Court, this 
lack of regulation allowed the Convivirs to strengthen paramilitary groups under the 
Castaño Gil brothers for three years in aspects of provision and logistics, financing, field 
operations coordinated with Public Forces, access to national, state, regional and local 
agencies, even supplanting the State in some regions of the country.”238 The Court found 
that areas where Convivirs operated in Antioquia coincided with areas historically 
occupied by the paramilitaries (particularly in the “banana axis”).239  
By way of their relation to the paramilitaries and local elites, some Convivirs grew 
into sophisticated income generating organizations. Urabá ACCU leader and banana 
entrepreneur Raul Hasbún described the income of the Convivirs through the Banana 
industry extortions and local contributions as “enormous,” allowing the Convivirs to 
provide logistical support to the security forces, rather than the other way around. The 
Urabá Convivirs became so sophisticated that they were able to launch major infrastructure 
projects like roads and aircraft landing strips to facilitate the logistical needs of the military 
and paramilitaries.240  “The Convivir solicited money from farm owners…the city 
government…and even the Army [while taking care of] machinery and materials for road 
construction.”241  
Hasbún’s paramilitary group worked with a network of twelve highly sophisticated 
Urabá Convivirs that fed him intelligence information along with the military and police.242  
The twelve groups were administratively subordinate to a parent Convivir called Papagayo, 
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which acted as an administrative and logistical command node.243  According to Hasbún, 
“It was the paramilitaries who generally undertook security operations because they had 
better resources. ‘On one occasion the Convivir gave the precise location of some 
guerrillas. When the army went to take action, the two trucks that they had were out of gas 
and one was without a battery. When they were finally going out, it turns out they did not 
have radios. Finally, they decided against the operation.’  Hasbún says that the Convivir 
provided gasoline to the Army, Police and the DAS…lending them cars and even 
radios.”244  Moreover, Hasbún testified that in cases where the intelligence agencies did 
not have the legal grounds to arrest a suspected guerrilla, they passed the Convivirs’ 
intelligence on to the paramilitaries, who would then assassinate the individual.245 In sum, 
the Convivirs acted as an interface to facilitate smoother operations between the military 
and paramilitaries, but the military did not develop adequate incentives to control the 
Convivirs or draw the paramilitaries back into the state’s security apparatus. 
A Question of State Capacity. During the mid-1990s, Colombia did not have the 
capacity to effectively organize, employ, and control civil-defense forces, which requires 
significant resources. In reality, the Convivir program was an ambitious and complex civil-
military operations plan that the state executed at one of its weakest moments in a knee-
jerk reaction to its inability to protect citizens from guerrilla incursion. Without resources, 
the overarching strategy to use the Convivirs to re-incorporate the paramilitaries into the 
State’s security framework was dead on arrival. Cárdenas, Eslava, and Ramírez define state 
capacity as “associated to military capacity, representing the state’s ability to overcome 
rebellious actions with force, or to bureaucratic and administrative capacity, representing 
the ability of the state to conduct its business effectively and efficiently.”246 A large part of 
state capacity is also the government’s ability to collect taxes from all eligible citizens 
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(Figure 4). However, as demonstrated here and in Chapter II, Colombia’s business class 
and elites were paying war taxes to the self-defense groups instead of the state. A detailed 
socio-economic analysis of 1990s Colombia is out of the scope of this paper, but the 
Soldados de Mi Pueblo Case in Chapter IV and Peruvian Rondas Campesinas Case in 
Chapter V demonstrates how an improvement in state capacity, and by default, the military, 
translates into more comprehensive controls over self-defense forces. 
 
Figure 4.  Colombian tax revenue (% of GDP).247 
Conclusion. Attempts to reform the Convivirs through Resolution 7164 in 1997 
failed and human rights violations became too numerous for the Convivirs to remain 
tolerated in the public eye. As a gesture to the FARC on the outset of a new peace 
negotiations in 1998, President Samper announced that the Convivirs would be 
dismantled.248 However, the dismantlement process did not go as planned and the 
remaining groups were absorbed into the illegal paramilitary apparatus, taking with them 
many of the military grade weapons initially provided by the government. A U.S. Embassy 
Cable states that “[In 1999, Vice President] Bell said…this decision may prove to have 
ambiguous human rights implications. The Convivir had often served as the nuclei for 
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nascent paramilitary groups, but he said the GOC could monitor their activities much more 
easily when they were legal. Many of the dismantled Convivirs had since gone 
underground.”249 During the early 2000s, some Convivirs that were not absorbed by the 
paramilitaries simply converted into private security and surveillance companies.250 
Overall, Botero’s grand strategy of drawing the paramilitaries back into the state’s 
COIN framework failed. The program ended prematurely due to the failure of the 
government to control not only the Convivirs, but to regain control of the paramilitaries it 
wished to rein in and re-incorporate. Furthermore, this case demonstrates that the 
government had no control over the actions of the military with respect to the Convivirs.  
“The controls that were created for the functioning of the Convivirs remained a dead letter 
in the legislation for their creation and regulation.”251 In operating under its own agenda 
without adequate resources to set up and fund a meaningful incentive structure, the military 
was largely responsible for the expansion of the Convivirs into paramilitary groups. The 
Convivirs may have helped smooth out operations by providing a legal conduit between 
the military and paramilitaries but it did not permit the integration of the paramilitaries into 
the state’s legal security apparatus, instead making the paramilitaries even stronger and 
more autonomous. In permitting the Convivirs to also answer to the paramilitaries and 
elites, the military exposed itself to high levels of asymmetric information, which made 
applying control measures nearly impossible. Moreover, the state lacked adequate 
resources to apply control mechanisms over the Convivirs and eventually take charge of 
the paramilitaries via the Convivirs. In the end, the state was left further weakened by the 
Convivirs while the paramilitaries were greatly strengthened. The year 1997 would mark 
the beginning of the paramilitaries’ peak era, when the groups unified under the AUC and 
finished their transition into offensive operations. 
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IV. THE HOMETOWN SOLDIERS 
The Soldados de mi Pueblo (Hometown Soldiers) Program was Colombia’s third 
attempt at implementing a civil-defense force program as part of a clear-hold-build 
counterinsurgency strategy. The program was established by President Álvaro Uribe Vélez 
in 2002 and, to the best if my knowledge, ended in 2014, around the same time that 
President Juan Manuel Santos commenced the FARC peace talks. Compared to its 
predecessors, it was a resounding success due to the following three factors: improved state 
capacity, incorporation of the Hometown Soldiers into the military command and control 
(C2) organization, and strict screening and monitoring control mechanisms. First, 
Colombia’s state capacity improved as a result of Plan Colombia and reforms under Uribe’s 
Democratic Security Strategy, bringing improved military capabilities and strength. 
Second, Colombia greatly limited the autonomy of the Hometown Soldiers by 
incorporating them as uniformed auxiliary forces under the organizational umbrella of the 
military. Third, the military implemented robust control mechanisms. Screening, 
monitoring, and training had the greatest impact, while monetary incentives played a 
smaller role. Oversight by professional army officers for each Hometown Soldiers Platoon 
was an adequate mechanism to prevent the soldiers—who were indoctrinated through 
military training and subject to the uniformed code of military justice—from engaging in 
moral hazard, shirking, or slack, despite the fact that they were only on duty part-time, and 
were permitted to live at home. Overall, the stark contrast between the first self-defense 
groups and Convivirs and the strictly monitored Hometown Soldiers, which were basically 
auxiliary units of the army, demonstrates that a state cannot implement a civil-defense 
program in a counterinsurgency just by handing over arms to civilians in exchange for 
intelligence without strict control mechanisms and a short tether.   
Background: The Democratic Security Strategy and Plan Colombia. The 
potent combination of the US-backed Plan Colombia and Uribe’s Democratic Security 
Policy (DSP) improved the capacity of Colombia’s armed forces and gave the state the 
resources and focus it needed to consolidate its state presence and finally turn the tide of 
the war against the guerrillas. Under Uribe, military spending increased by 137% and troop 
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levels by 68% between 2002 and 2010 (see Figures 5 and 6). Uribe also instituted a new 
tax on Colombia’s most wealthy to fund the expansion, professionalization, and 
strengthening of the military and police forces.252  The DSP’s objective was to “strengthen 
the rule of law throughout Colombia, through the reinforcement of democratic authority. 
That is, through the free exercise of authority by democratic institutions, the effective 
application of the law and the active participation of the citizen in matters of common 
interest.”253  Uribe’s overarching goal was to extend the state’s authority over the whole of 
its territory, which he determined was his strategic center of gravity in the conflict.254  
Unlike his predecessors, and as a reflection of U.S. influence during the onset of the Bush 
administration’s Global War on Terror, Uribe did not favor pursuing peace negotiations 
with the guerrillas, but rather chose to pursue a military objective of total defeat through a 
combination of military action, sustained by whole-of-government institutional and 
neoliberal economic reforms.  “The security forces will initiate the process of consolidating 
State control of territory, establishing their permanent and definitive presence in all 
municipalities with the help of mobile brigades and other units of the Armed Forces and 
National Police. Units composed of professional soldiers, campesino soldiers, and National 
Police carabineros will guarantee that territorial control is maintained.”255 Despite its 
‘whole-of-government’ and interagency approach, the DSP had a mostly military focus, 
rooted in the individual policies of Uribe, Plan Colombia and the Global War on Terror. 
As detailed in Chapter II, Plan Colombia was one of the U.S.’s largest and most ambitious 
military aid projects in its time and was instrumental in transforming Colombia’s military 
into a more robust, capable, and professional force. 
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Figure 5.  Military spending increased with Plan Colombia and the DSP.256 
Figure 6.  Troop levels increased by almost 70% during Uribe’s Administration.257 
256 Data obtained from World Bank, “Military Expenditure (Current LCU),” accessed April 28, 2018, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CN?locations=CO. 
257 Data obtained from World Bank, “Armed Forces Personnel, Total,” accessed April 28, 2018, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1?locations=CO. 
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Soldados de mi Pueblo. In 2002, as part of the DSP’s strategy, Uribe activated 
Article 13 of Law 48 (not the same as Law 48 of 1968), a 1993 conscription law allowing 
the organization or peasant soldiers for the defense of rural areas.258  The Colombian 
government launched the “Soldados Campesinos” (Peasant Soldiers), a civil-defense 
program that consisted of 21,000 militia soldiers linked to a network of 4 million unarmed 
neighborhood watch informants.259 The program, later renamed more respectfully to 
“Soldados de mi Pueblo” (Hometown Soldiers or Home guard), initially received criticism 
from the Human Rights Ombudsman, the UN, and other human rights organizations due to 
its resemblance to prior attempts at creating civil-defense forces.260 Fortunately, their 
(legitimate) concerns would remain unrealized due to reasons I will describe below. Uribe 
had been the most ardently vocal supporter of the Convivirs (which were most active in 
Antioquia where he governed) and a large proponent of the concept of implementing 
civilian self-defense forces in a COIN environment. Like the Convivirs, the Soldados de 
mi Pueblo served as cheap force multipliers in rural areas with insufficient police presence 
in over 450 areas.261 Their mandate was the same as the Convivirs; they would act as rural 
defense units and report on suspicious activities. Responsibilities were divided between 
two branches: the armed militias were to serve in a light, defensive security role (as stay-
behind forces in a ‘Clear and Hold’ strategy), while the unarmed civilian informants were 
charged with collecting and passing on valuable intelligence to the military or police with 
regard to suspicious activities in their community.262 The troops’ main tasks were to patrol 
the town center, search cars at village entry checkpoints, interact with the local population, 
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and aid in civic action projects.263 As with the Convivirs, the Military provided the 
Hometown Soldiers with restricted use weapons.   
As Colombia’s third attempt at implementing a civil defense program, the 
Hometown Soldiers were different than their predecessors in the following ways:  First, 
even though the Hometown soldiers were cheap force multipliers, the government invested 
considerably more funds into their recruitment, training and support (about half of the 
investment for a regular soldier) than the Convivirs, which were funded by private elites, 
extortion, and paramilitaries. Second, while the Convivirs were mostly anonymous, plain-
clothed agents (even to their local members of government), the Hometown Soldiers wore 
military uniforms (except for undercover informants). Third, rather than the previous ‘give 
peasants weapons and hope for the best’ tactic, the government incorporated the Hometown 
Soldiers into the military as a reserve component (organized in platoons) that gave men the 
option of remaining in their local villages on a part-time basis (under a service contract of 
18 months) instead of completing the obligatory 18–24 month full-time military service 
away from home required for males between ages 18–49.264 Fourth, the government had 
more robust oversight and control mechanisms for the Hometown Soldiers than for the 
Convivirs.   
Vetting. The military used thorough vetting procedures for selecting members of 
Hometown Soldier platoons. “Army investigators, Administrative Department of Security 
(DAS) and Office of the Prosecutor General (FISCALIA) conduct[ed] background checks 
to weed out youths with criminal records and potential infiltrators from illegal Armed 
Groups (IAG).”265   A U.S. Embassy cable described the vetting process in detail:  
First, a medical doctor “conducted a brief physical examination of each 
potential recruit ... [The Commander] then conducted one-on-one 
interviews with the remaining…candidates in each town, after which each 
candidate underwent a second, more thorough medical examination. Army 
investigators interviewed the parents and neighbors of each potential 
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recruit, while the…DAS—Colombia’s FBI equivalent—and … FISCALIA 
weeded out youths with criminal records. Military intelligence personnel 
then ran the names of the remaining potential recruits through security 
databases to determine if any were potential infiltrators from illegal armed 
groups. Colonel Pinto told POLOFFs that these security checks had exposed 
four FARC informants…266 
Upon selection, each soldier received 10–12 weeks of training, 4–6 weeks less than 
for regular soldiers due to the fact that the peasant soldiers did not receive instruction in 
offensive tactics.267  The training was divided into four phases consisting of a “regimen of 
physical, tactical and technical training,” including, but not limited to, basic military 
indoctrination, human rights training, an overview of the rules of engagement, basic 
intelligence operations, explosives (mines) identification, how to interact with civilians, 
and understanding the nature of the enemy.268 Upon completion, “the platoons are 
deployed to their hometowns, where they work closely with local police and a platoon of 
professional soldiers stationed nearby.”269 
Monitoring. Because the Hometown Soldiers were incorporated into the Military 
under the “Conscription Reform Law,” the Government, by default, kept these new militia 
platoons on a short leash. The platoons fell under the command and control organization 
of their local military brigade, which was responsible for recruiting, vetting, training, and 
arming the 50–250 Hometown Soldiers for each municipality.270   A professional military 
officer and a company of professional soldiers were charged with assisting in leading the 
platoons.  “These professional soldiers—who were relatively well-paid volunteers, rather 
than draftees—serve as mentors and are available to assist peasant soldiers in times of 
crisis.”271 While off duty, peasant soldiers were required to store their rifles in the 
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armory.272 Moreover, the soldiers wore Army uniforms, making them easily identifiable 
and therefore, accountable to the local community and municipal government. 
Sanctions/Rewards/Incentives. Because the Hometown soldiers were 
incorporated into the military organization, they were subject to the Military Code of 
Justice and would be punished by those standards according to the regulations violated.273  
Hometown Soldiers earned a meager monthly salary of just 50,000 Pesos or 20 USD (not 
adjusted for inflation).274 They received healthcare, food, clothing, and extra leave in case 
of a domestic emergency. Soldiers with prior military service received additional bonuses 
in their retirement pension, farming grants, and education benefits.275  One of the non-
monetary incentives for joining was that they were permitted to serve a shorter commitment 
than their regular army counterparts and they were allowed to live in their own homes and 
continue their civilian occupation part-time. Undercover informants, on the other hand, did 
not receive a monthly salary, but were paid per item of intelligence handed over to the 
military and police. “Thirty billion pesos (roughly USD 11 million) have been allocated to 
pay informants who provide intelligence that leads directly to a successful operation 
against an illegal armed group.”276  Once Hometown Soldiers completed their service 
obligation, they had the option of joining the regular Colombian armed forces or separating, 
at which point the Colombian government provided vocational training in trades such as 
fish raising, agriculture, or livestock husbandry.277 The vocational training program not 
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only aimed to help the soldiers transition back to normal life, but also contributed to the 
economic and social development of their respective villages. 
Effectiveness. Unlike their predecessors, no reports indicate that the Hometown 
Soldiers engaged in moral hazard, particularly by committing human rights abuses.278 A 
potential vulnerability in the program was that in villages previously held by the guerrillas, 
individual Hometown Soldiers had kinship ties to members of the FARC and ELN, 
increasing the risk for agency slack. However, there are no reports indicating that any 
soldiers had questionable loyalty. If anything, their local ties were a benefit because they 
had instant credibility and trust with the population. The Soldiers were effective in 
fulfilling their role as experts in the local environment. According to a 2004 U.S. State 
Department memo, “The soldier’s familiarity with the hinterland has proven to be an 
effective tool in finding and neutralizing members of illegal armed groups…[they] have 
become instrumental in executing the military’s ‘clear and hold’ strategy, serving as local 
stay-behind forces in conflictive areas…In addition, hometown soldiers’ confidence with 
local residence has increased citizen participation in the Government’s informants 
network.”279  
Once an area was cleared and given over to the Hometown Soldiers, the Army was 
able to confidently leave the area and conduct offensive operations elsewhere. The 
presence of uniformed soldiers with familiar faces provided a sense of security and also a 
deterrent to guerrillas and criminals. For example, in Sale de San Francisco, a Hometown 
Soldier Platoon NCO claimed that petty crime had decreased by 80% and that the mayor, 
safe from kidnapping, was finally able to return to the town and govern from his home.280  
The Hometown Soldiers provided valuable guard duties to local government officials that 
previously were forced to govern from outside their municipalities due to threats from the 
guerrillas and paramilitaries.281 The establishment of state presence in areas that had not 
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known security for decades via the Hometown Soldiers not only helped pave the way for 
mayors to govern from home, but also for the state to establish police presence in all of 
Colombia’s municipalities by February 2004.282  
Conclusion. In comparison, the cases of the Hometown Soldiers, Self-Defense 
Groups and Convivirs demonstrates that a weak state with a corrupt socio-economic 
environment (and a myriad of alternative actors that could provide better incentives than 
the military) such as Colombia’s should never organize self-defense forces without 
resources or without implementing a robust training program, strict control measures, and 
a very short tether. The only way Colombia was able to finally and successfully implement 
the civil-defense force concept in a clear-hold COIN strategy was by incorporating the 
forces into the military as auxiliary reserves. Had the state just armed civilians without 
oversight again, it would have likely had the same results that it had with the first Self-
Defense Groups and the Convivirs. The Hometown Soldiers program owed its success to 
the following factors: the program received adequate funding which made possible the 
application of robust control mechanisms. The recruits were vetted at several levels, they 
received 10–12 weeks of indoctrination and training, they wore uniforms which made them 
both identifiable and accountable, they could only carry their weapons while on duty, they 
had strict oversight from professional officers, and they were only permitted to conduct 
defensive operations. Even though they were payed little, the Hometown Soldiers had the 
benefits of staying in their hometown, receiving a waiver from the draft, and receiving 
vocational training upon the completion of their obligation. There are no reports of rogue 
units, paramilitarization, moral hazard, conflict of interest, agency slack, or shirking of 
duties. The program also was a success in that it helped establish state presence throughout 
its territory. Thus, the Hometown Soldiers can be considered Colombia’s success story for 
the use a pro-government militia in counterinsurgency. 
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V. PERU’S RONDAS CAMPESINAS 
The case of the Rondas Campesinas civil defense forces is an excellent example of 
how a government can adjust its policy to regain control of wayward pro-government 
militias. This case also makes for a constructive comparison to Colombia due to the 
following similarities: Like Colombia, Peru faced socio-economic and geopolitical 
challenges typical of Latin America during the Cold War. Both countries have a fractured 
geographic landscape of deserts, mountains, and jungles, making state consolidation and 
counterinsurgency operations difficult. Both countries faced a rapid proliferation of the 
illegal drug trade and related crime during the 1980s and are the world’s top two cocaine 
producing countries.283 Peru’s communist insurgency also lasted beyond its expiration 
date, as it did in Colombia. Lastly, both countries experimented with civil-defense forces. 
Like Colombia, after several attempts at organizing and employing CDFs, Peru also 
eventually found success through the incorporation of its militias into the military as 
auxiliary or reserve forces. However, unlike Colombia, which formed brand new civil-
defense groups under new policies after each failure, Peru mostly dealt with the same 
groups for the duration of the conflict, but adjusted its policies as time went on. In the case 
of the Rondas Campesinas, the state, after some trial and error, lost and later regained 
control over the same groups by improving state capacity and implementing an effective 
combination of all four control mechanisms: monitoring, screening, sanctions, and 
incentives.  
Each Ronda Campesina was different, varying by region, capability and 
involvement in the conflict until they were reorganized more uniformly as the standardized 
Self-Defense Committees (CADs) and incorporated as an official branch of the Peruvian 
Armed Forces by the Alberto Fujimori administration in 1991.  I will primarily cover 1980–
2000, which was the most intense period of the insurgency. In these two decades, the 
relationship between the military and the Rondas evolved over three phases: In the first 
phase, the military organized Civil Defense Committees (CDCs) from existing Rondas and 
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created new groups in villages that did not already have Rondas. The unarmed CDCs were 
mostly left to fend for themselves, with little interaction, training, or support from the 
military, and as a result, shirked their duties in order to avoid targeting by the guerrillas. In 
some cases, they used their status as CDCs to settle old scores with neighboring villages. 
In the second phase, between 1985–1988, the Army retreated to the barracks in protest over 
government attempts to reform and rein in the military. With the absence of the Army from 
the COIN effort, CDCs in the Apurimac River Valley (VRA)—Peru’s primary Coca 
growing region—began a process of paramilitarization akin to the Colombian self-defense 
groups in the 1970s and 1980s (although not as extreme). These offensively capable and 
more sophisticated CDCs, which identified as Defensa Civil Antisubversivas (DECAS) 
were successful at eliminating the guerrillas from the VRA, but they funded their expansion 
and efforts with income obtained through drug trafficking connections. The DECAS 
became warlords and effectively turned the VRA into a para-state. The third phase is 
widely considered a success story for a state principal regaining control of a rogue militia 
agent. In 1991, President Alberto Fujimori recalibrated Peru’s COIN strategy to 
standardize all CDCs and DECAS as Comités de Autodefensa y Desarollo (CADs), and 
passed legislation to incorporate them into the armed forces. The military came up with a 
set of control mechanisms that successfully reigned in the DECAS and resulted in the 
CADs performing assigned tasks with minimal instances of principal-agent conflict.    
Background. From independence on, Peru’s experience with democracy has been 
sporadic, the government oscillating between elected civilian governments and military 
juntas. For the greater part of Peru’s history, the military was highly politicized and played 
a tutelary role to the state, pushing political reforms and at times, exerting direct rule. 
During the first half of the period of military rule from 1968–1980, the junta initiated an 
ambitious package of pre-emptive progressive reforms, such as land redistribution and 
agricultural cooperative programs meant to alleviate the conditions it recognized as 
conducive to Marxist revolution.284 While land reform measures in the 1970s dissolved 
much of what remained of the already declining latifundia and haciendas, the state failed 
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to evenly apply developmental reforms throughout the country and largely neglected hard-
to-reach rural areas such as Ayacucho, which would later become the epicenter of the 
conflict.285 According to McClintock, “Highlands peasants had pinned their hopes first on 
land reform, only to find that the reform barely benefited them materially; then, they had 
hoped the Marxist parties and the New Democratic government would improve their lot, 
only to see the situation worsen.”286 
During the junta years, GDP per capita was stagnant and inflation high. The junta’s 
reforms could not overcome back-to-back economic crises in the 1970s and 80s and other 
systemic internal issues. The economy continued to decline and poverty persisted 
particularly in the rural areas. General Juan Velasco, Peru’s Military President in the early 
1970s, chose left-leaning economic policies that would have long term detrimental effects. 
First, he converted private companies to State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), confiscating 
private land from local and multinational firms for nationalization.287 For example, the 
government seized two oil fields owned by American petroleum company, Exxon.288 
Second, he banned private capital from the public utilities, fishing, and agricultural 
sectors.289 Third, he implemented price controls on basic commodities and foodstuffs. 
Lastly, he attempted to manipulate the currency market and Peru’s foreign trade, catalyzing 
a process of hyperinflation that would continue into the late 1980s, at which point President 
Alan Garcia largely continued the same policies.290  “Whatever the promises and the costs 
of the many kinds of reform attempted by the Velasco government, the ship sank because 
of the inadequate attention to balances between spending and productive capacity, and 
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between export incentives and import demand.”291  The effects of these policies were 
amplified in poverty-stricken rural areas like the Ayacucho, where Sendero Luminoso 
(SL), a radicalized off-split of the Peruvian Communist Party quietly planned to mobilize 
for a major guerrilla offensive. 
The Sendero Luminoso launched the first phase of its insurgency by burning ballot 
boxes in Ayacucho on 17 May 1980, the night before Peru’s first democratic elections since 
1963. Founded by Ayacucho college professor Abimael Guzman, the SL was organized 
into anonymous cells and operated in so-called “guerrilla columns” that used attack-and-
retreat tactics.292  The SL mostly used terrorism and infrastructure sabotage to spread fear 
and degrade confidence in the government. Overtime, the organization became highly 
centralized around Guzman’s cult of personality, which proved to be a critical vulnerability 
when he was captured in 1992, along with a treasure trove of SL documents containing the 
identities of thousands of operatives.293  In the first two years of the conflict, the 
government largely ignored the SL, considering it a nuisance in the countryside that only 
required minor police response—”Government officials usually referred to members of 
Sendero as ‘common delinquents’ or ‘cattle thieves.’”294  When the insurgency reached the 
urban areas on the coast, the government authorized military action, and placed most of 
Ayacucho under a state of emergency and military authority in March of 1982. The main 
front of the war eventually spread to include the Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Apurimac 
Regions.295  Because military leaders took steps to ensure that the new civilian run 
government would not interfere in internal military affairs, the counterinsurgency 
campaign fell solely under the prerogative of the military, and there was little to no 
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interagency or government institutional involvement.296   Moreover, the government did 
not attempt reforms in the affected areas of Ayacucho, and the military took an entirely 
kinetic conventional warfare approach to combatting the SL, which was ineffective against 
a Maoist organization that operated in anonymous cell organizations. The Peruvian state 
could only win by improving living conditions in the Ayacucho with a unified inter-agency 
approach and emphasizing robust intelligence collection. Conventional military tactics 
only damaged the legitimacy of the government by producing significant and 
indiscriminate civilian casualties. The military, which was conducting COIN efforts 
autonomously and without government oversight, committed serious human rights abuses 
and massacres against peasants, which the civilian administration supposedly was not 
aware of until the discovery of mass graves in 1985, to which the Garcia Administration 
reacted by firing three of the army’s highest ranking general officers and attempting to 
impose human rights regulations and reforms on the armed forces.297  However, little 
would improve in the state’s COIN strategy for the remainder of the 1980s. The Army 
withdrew from the fight in protest to the reforms, and the government, strapped with a 
failing economy, failed to take on a greater role in COIN decision making or inter-agency 
involvement. Moreover, the failing economy and the use of secret death squads to target 
left- leaning labor leaders also aggravated the insurgency situation and fueled the narrative 
of state repression. Meanwhile, as Peru’s socioeconomic conditions deteriorated and drug 
trafficking proliferated, the SL rapidly expanded its influence from Peru’s rural to urban 
areas, and by the late 1980s, there was hardly a populated area in Peru that did not feel the 
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Figure 7.  Geographic representation of Sendero presence between 1981–2006.298 
The Sendero Luminoso ultimately worked against itself by oppressing and 
terrorizing the demographic it depended on most for logistic and popular support: the 
indigenous peasants. This was an odd tactic for a Maoist-Leninist guerrilla whose principal 
support base was supposedly the peasantry. In previously ungoverned and neglected spaces 
like Ayacucho, the peasants initially welcomed SL’s imposition of some form of law and 
order and promises of better quality of living, accompanied by gifts of stolen goods and 
livestock.299 The SL’s actions against the highly unpopular and repressive police also 
initially gained the approval of village elders.300  However, the SL imposed strict, 
puritanical rules on the indigenous communities with terror and brutality, and the peasants 
quickly grew disenchanted. Indigenous life was deeply imbued with Andean tradition and 
religion, sometimes combined with Catholicism or other forms of Christianity, and a 
fondness for perennial rituals and fiestas, all of which the SL forbade.301  Moreover, the 
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SL’s “actions included the killing of communal authorities and government supporters 
through popular trials. More often, the Shining Path killed civilians who refused to live in 
accordance with the movement’s rules.”302 According to Degregori, indigenous village 
elders attained rank by virtue of age and through a traditional civic and religious accession 
process. Killing and replacing them with young, inexperienced and often non-indigenous 
SL leaders was the SL’s most fatal error.303  “Above all, it was when shining path refused 
to recognize community authorities that the first overt rebellions occurred.”304   Even 
though the SL promised to deliver an egalitarian society to the peasants, it delivered the 
opposite by subjugating and patronizing them in a manner similar to that of the old 
hacienda system. The SL replicated the hacienda system by replacing the indigenous 
leadership with its own “proletarian vanguard” leadership, in accordance with Guzman’s 
Leninist view that “the peasantry [is] the main force in…society while the proletariat [is] 
the leading class…”305 In other words, Guzman’s embrace of vanguardism translated into 
totalitarian subjugation of the peasantry through the use of terror in a manner worse than 
that of their former patrons.  
Another way the Sendero Luminoso alienated its indigenous audience was by 
disrupting the communities’ economic livelihood. For example, the SL prohibited 
indigenous communities from trading their wares and crops at local and urban markets, 
punishing or murdering those that resisted.306  This tactic was part of Guzman’s plan to cut 
off villages from the capitalist system and make them self-sufficient communist societies, 
as well as to cut the cities off from agricultural products. As a result, the peasants not only 
could not produce an income from their labor, they also could not obtain basic commodities 
like matches or salt from the city.307  To defy the SL and go to market to trade could cost 
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a peasant his or her life. Alienated by these actions, the peasants under SL rule could not 
find recourse from the largely absent Peruvian government, and when the military passed 
through, it often indiscriminately slaughtered villages where SL was known to have made 
contact, regardless of whether the association was positive or negative. In response to the 
above grievances, the peasants independently mobilized self-defense committees to protect 
themselves.308   
On 21 January, 1983, peasants in the village of Huaychao, Huanta Province, 
attacked a column of seven SL guerrillas with sharpened sticks and rocks. This 
unprecedented action shocked the nation, “which was of the general though erroneous 
opinion that Shining Path enjoyed near-unanimous acceptance among the Ayacuchano 
peasantry.”309  Unfortunately, five days later, another peasant patrol ambushed and killed 
a group of eight nationally respected journalists on their way to Huaychao after mistaking 
them for guerillas.310  The second attack temporarily overshadowed the peasants’ initial 
achievement, but both stories brought national awareness to these Peasant Patrols or 
“Rondas Campesinas.”  Even though both events brought the Rondas into the spotlight for 
the first time, the concept of peasant vigilantism was not entirely new; peasants had already 
organized Rondas Campesinas in Cajamarca in the mid 1970s to defend their villages 
against petty thieves and cattle rustlers, but never before against a guerrilla column.311   
Phase 1: The CDCs. In 1983, the Peruvian armed forces had a mostly 
conventional, military-centric COIN strategy of repression that employed “drain the sea” 
and population transfer tactic similar to the “strategic hamleting” in Vietnam, which 
resulted in major population displacement in the rural areas. Moreover, after the military 
purged an area of guerrillas, it did not leave any security forces behind to prevent the SL 
from returning. Consequently, guerrillas would later return and punish the village 
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inhabitants for collaborating with security forces.312 This changed in late 1983, when the 
military started organizing more Rondas, officially dubbed Civil Defense Committees 
(CDCs). Because neutrality was not an option, the military coerced villages to form CDCs 
but neither provided nor permitted firearms, leaving the Ronderos to defend themselves 
with sharpened sticks and rocks, an inadequate defense against heavily armed guerrilla 
columns.313  Consequently, CDCs, at times, would shirk their duties and purposely avoid 
confrontation with guerrillas, allowing them to pass through their village unobstructed. 
Most of the time, the SL massacred the poorly-armed CDCs, which made for an easy 
target.314  
The military mostly took a hands-off approach to the CDCs, but did exert some 
control mechanisms. First, Marines often conducted patrols with the CDCs, permitting 
them to carry shotguns under supervision, providing them with ammunition for their 
homemade firearms, and providing some training in the use of hand grenades.315 However, 
the military would not arm the Rondas wholesale until 1991 and until then, most depended 
on homemade wooden guns, sling shots and machetes, or weapons acquired from dead 
Senderistas or drug traffickers.316  During the 1980s, it was illegal for militias to carry 
firearms, and both the Army and the politicians in Lima were not yet convinced that arming 
civilians was worth the risk.317 Second, as a measure against infiltration, the military 
registered community members to keep track of which Ronderos belonged to which 
village. Third, one of the incentives for villages that formed their own CDCs, which 
indicated their loyalty to the state, was that they could elect their committee members and 
leaders, which would then require approval by an officer. Otherwise, the military 
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commander would hand pick the individuals himself.318  More often than not, the strongest 
incentive for villages to form CDCs was to avoid repression from the military, despite the 
fact that this action also made them a target for the guerrillas.319  Nonetheless, the army 
applied few control mechanisms over the CDCs during the early years of the 
counterinsurgency effort. According to Koonings and Kruijt, “Although the army 
compelled rural communities to organize CDCs, and presumed to subordinate and control 
them, in actuality they made little attempt to train, provision, mobilize or utilize the CDCs 
in any systematic way…the Army did not see it worth their time and effort to develop the 
capabilities of the CDCs, nor to create more sophisticated mechanisms of control over 
them.”320  
Left to their own devices, CDCs outside of the scope of military supervision began 
to shirk their patrol duties in order to settle old scores with neighboring villages. For 
example, in December 1984, two fights broke out between CDCs in Ayacucho and the 
Apurimac River Valley leaving 32 Ronderos dead.321 Meanwhile, in the Cajamarca 
Province, Rondas in three municipalities used their popularity among the peasantry to defy 
the administration and rulings of the Lieutenant Governor and local sub-prefects.322   
Municipal authorities and local police complained that the Rondas were displacing them 
and coopting their official duties to govern and enforce the law. It was also around this 
time, particularly in 1984, that the Rondas attracted negative attention for using their status 
as CDCs to pursue old land disputes and vendettas with neighboring communities (see 
Figure 8).323 
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Figure 8.   “Reported deaths and disappearances in Peru’s internal conflict by 
responsible actor, 1980–2000.”324  Note that casualties attributed to the Rondas 
Campesinas (CADs) spiked in 1984. 
Between 1985 and 1988, the Army placed an indefinite pause on the 
counterinsurgency campaign, retreating to the barracks in protest against President 
Garcia’s attempt to reorganize the defense ministry under civilian leadership and hold the 
military to human rights standards. “The armed forces resented the Garcı́a government not 
only for its new human rights policy but also…for decreasing military spending. Defense 
budget cuts translated into drastic reductions in officers’ salaries, low morale, early 
retirements by officers, and desertions. Army units in insurgency zones lacked helicopters 
and were short on gasoline to operate the ones they did have, and they were in need of 
food, ammunition, and other equipment.”325 After the Army abandoned the CDCs, the 
marines continued to accompany them on occasional patrols. However, in the Army’s 
absence, the SL recovered from three years of brutal military repression, flooding back into 
areas that had been cleared, and seizing the opportunity to ruthlessly slaughter or infiltrate 
the now vulnerable Rondas.326 Those CDCs that were not butchered by the SL elected to 
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dissolve, while others tried to stand their ground with mostly negative results.327 
Meanwhile, CDCs in the VRA found alternative means of support to withstand, and 
eventually expel the guerrilla presence from their valley. 
Phase 2: The DECAS. Until 1986, the CDCs of the Apurimac River Valley were 
stand-alone units organized at the village level with no coordinating unified command and 
regional control authority over them. That changed when two Ronderos, Antonio Cardenas 
and Pompeyo Javier Rivera Terres (“Commandante Huyahuaco”) reorganized and 
consolidated the CDCs in the VRA into 22 regional (zonal) commands with guidance from 
the Peruvian Marines. The zonal commands coordinated with the central militia 
headquarters (Sede Central) at Pichihuillca, which also acted as a fortified armory for 
distributing stolen guerrilla weapons to the Ronderos.328 Under this new organizational 
framework, the CDCs of the VRA adopted the name of Defensa Civil Antisubversivas 
(DECAS). The formation of the DECAS marked the transition of these particular Rondas 
Campesinas from defensive to offensive operations.329 “Huychuaco’s early operations 
employed hundreds [to thousands] of ronderos, mobilized from dozens of communities 
and deployed en masse to comb the valley in search of guerrillas, infiltrators in 
collaborators.”330  Finding this method inefficient, Huychuaco modified his strategy by 
training smaller units of Ronderos in the image of special forces. These better trained and 
more disciplined units utilized ambush tactics instead of combing the area to eradicate 
Sendero columns. Due to their lack of long range, automatic weapons, they relied on close-
quarters combat and would wait for the SL militants to run out of ammo before engaging.331 
Like the CDCs, the early DECAS were initially poorly armed, and poorly supplied.   
Daily patrolling also diverted farmers from their labor, making it difficult to 
produce a living. As a result, the DECAS relied on donations from villages for their 
supplies, with no apparent stipend from the state for their contribution to the 
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counterinsurgency campaign.332 The reliance on private funding in the absence of state 
support brings to mind the self-defense groups of 1970s Colombia. Huayhuaco petitioned 
the state for military grade rifles with the caveat that the marines would exert strict 
oversight over armed ronderos and keep an inventory of issued weapons. Regardless of the 
need to acquire weapons through legal channels, both the Army and the government were 
reluctant to arm the DECAS—as they had been with the CDCs of Ayacucho—and, with 
the exception of a symbolic gesture of 200 shotguns from Garcia himself, and a short one-
article Decree declaring the Rondas’ legitimacy,333 Huayhuaco’s entreaties were 
rejected.334 As a result, the DECAS sought arms from illegal sources. 
As the DECAS became more sophisticated in their scope, they grew adept at 
rooting out SL guerrillas in the Apurimac River Valley. Eventually the DECAS formed 
their own Comandos Especiales (special forces) units that deployed throughout the 
emergency zones. By late 1989, the VRA was largely guerrilla free, and the DECAS zones 
were under strict control of DECAS commandos.335 No person was permitted to move 
about the zones without identification papers and prior approval from the DECAS. 
Moreover, no adult male or female was exempt from standing guard or contributing to the 
resistance. According to Rondas expert, Mario Fumerton, some zones came under such 
strict control of the DECAS that the Army did not pass through without coordinating with 
DECAS commandos first.336  These were obvious red flags that the DECAS were on the 
path to larger scale paramilitarism. The Marines, in expecting the DECAS to defend the 
Apurimac villages against subversives, but without providing competitive material 
incentives, were running out of leverage with the DECAS as they grew more powerful and 
autonomous. When moral support and fire protection initially were adequate incentives for 
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the inexperienced, untrained, and unarmed CDCs, the more hardened DECAS, some of 
which obtained training in special operations, would require different control mechanisms.  
Not all DECAS groups were the same and varied in their character by province. 
Some groups fell under the patronage of Marines, while others fell under the patronage of 
drug traffickers, and some continued to rely on donations from their villages. Meanwhile, 
some Rondas outside of the VRA remained unimposing cadres armed with sticks and 
rocks. The autonomy of the DECAS depended on their proximity to military bases as well 
as their contact with drug traffickers. Inter-service rivalry also influenced the dynamics 
between the military and the DECAS. While the army was decisively absent from the 
conflict in the latter part of the 1980s due to political disagreements with the Garcia 
administration, the Marines continued to engage in the fight and worked with the DECAS 
sporadically, and in some cases provided arms to the groups.337  “Through a combination 
of shrewd leadership and clever alliances made with local marine infantry commanders (in 
opposition to army detachments) and with local Colombian-linked drug traffickers, the 
DECAS were able to secure modern firearms and weaponry, and thereby push the Shining 
Path out of the Apurimac River Valley completely.”338 Other than marine garrisons, the 
state was not present in the VRA, or more broadly, the VRAEM (Apurimac, Ene and 
Mantaro River Valley), where some of the largest coca crops in South America were 
produced. Thus, the VRAEM was an environment rife for alternative economic 
opportunity.339  
As stated above, with the exception of those groups sponsored by the Marines, the 
DECAS were mostly autonomous, and became even more so after some DECAS 
commandos, such as Huayhuaco allied with drug traffickers in late 1989, transforming their 
Rondas into mini warlord fiefs.340  “Some of the zonal militia commanders were regularly 
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seen driving around in new 4x4 pickups. They also began to buy tractors and constructing 
various clandestine airstrips in the jungle… [which they charged] the narcotraficantes a 
tax of between 5 and 10 million dollars [to use] on every flight out.”341  The DECAS used 
this money to fund administrative and operational expenses, community works, firearms, 
and other essential supplies. DECAS peasants also became more engaged in coca growing, 
in part because coca crops were easier to tend with a busy patrol schedule and because they 
were more lucrative.342 These actions were not without legal consequence: Huayhuaco was 
arrested for drug trafficking in 1989 (effectively ending his career as DECAS commander), 
and the alliance of the DECAS with drug traffickers brought negative attention to the 
peasant counter-resistance. Thus, the inconsistent and patchwork control mechanisms 
implemented by the Marines were insufficient particularly given the alternative 
opportunities provided by the thriving drug trade in the VRAE area. 
Phase 3: The CADs. In 1990, Peru was reeling from an economic crisis of 
mammoth proportions. President Garcia’s economic policies and absence of a cohesive 
counterinsurgency plan led the country to ruin. Reversing attempts toward free market 
reforms made by his predecessor, Garcia sought to nationalize industry through the creation 
of State Owned Enterprises and depleted government reserves to stimulate the economy. 
Soon after Garcia capped foreign debt service payments to 10% of GDP, the global market 
ostracized Peru, and the economy went into a tailspin. Towards the end of Garcia’s 
administration, inflation peaked into the 7000th percentile, GDP growth was at -12.3%, and 
with a reserves balance falling to as low as -$3.9 billion (current), Peru was neither able to 
pay, nor was it eligible to borrow foreign debt.343 Meanwhile, because of the Army’s four 
year hiatus and a dependable income from drug trafficking, the Sendero Luminoso was 
gaining territory through a campaign of extreme violence and bloodshed, the tactics of 
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which could be compared to those of the Khmer Rouge and even the Islamic State.344 By 
1990, the SL had done enormous damage to Peru’s infrastructure. For example, its attacks 
on power plants nearly doubled in 1988, costing a cumulative $15 billion (1990 USD) in 
damages in the span of nine years.345   
In 1991, Peruvians elected dark horse candidate, Alberto Fujimori, who would 
dramatically change Peru’s economic, political, and security landscapes, for better or 
worse. Despite Fujimori’s corruption and degradation of Peru’s democracy—he dissolved 
Congress in a self-coup, rewrote the constitution to stay in power, and has been indicted 
for corruption—he did make key economic and military decisions that would turn the tide 
of the war in the state’s favor. First, he implemented reforms that “did away with practically 
all the obstacles to private investment that had been introduced by the Velasco and Garcia 
administrations. A vast privatization program was implemented along with a redefinition 
of the intervention of the public sector in the Peruvian economy.”346 During Fujimori’s 
administration, Peru’s GDP grew at an annual rate of 3.9%, inflation declined to below 
10%, and reserves grew to $2.1 billion in 1997, ending at around -$130 million in 2000.347   
Second, Fujimori revitalized the counterinsurgency campaign, raising military 
spending from $45 million to $1 billion (converted from LCU to current USD) by 1996.348 
Before launching a new counterinsurgency campaign, he purged the senior military ranks 
of disloyal and corrupt officers and reasserted executive control over the military, which 
had been largely autonomous from the civilian government during the prior three 
administrations.349 “Improved intelligence and an end to internal divisions within the 
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military allowed effective engagement of insurgent forces and effective (and rapid) support 
to threatened Rondas.”350 Fujimori adopted an intelligence-focused strategy that included 
the Rondas Campesinas as a major component. One of his landmark decisions was to 
integrate the Rondas Campesinas more professionally into the state’s counterinsurgency 
strategy. His first action was to legally recognize and arm the Rondas through Legislative 
Decrees 740 and 741 of November 1991, which rechristened the Rondas as Comites de 
Autodefensa y Desarrollo (CADs) and the “fourth branch of the armed forces.”351  The 
stated function of the CADs was “the self-defense of the community, to prevent the 
infiltration of terrorism and drug trafficking, to defend against their attacks and to support 
the Armed Forces and the National Police in the tasks of peacemaking and national 
development.”352  A year later, the government passed Supreme Decree (DS) 077–92-DE, 
which defined the economic development portion the CADs’ obligations and detailed a 
more comprehensive outline of their organization, functions, and eventual 
demobilization.353 According to Article 3 of Decree 741, the CADs were subordinate to 
the military chain of command assigned to their respective geographic area.354 The joint 
command was responsible for deciding on the amount of ammunition to be distributed as 
well as for “formulating the directive of the organization, obligations, duties, rights and 
prohibitions of the members of the Autodefensa Committees.”355  Subsequently, the 
military came up with a set of control mechanisms that successfully reigned in the DECAS 
and resulted in the Rondas performing assigned tasks with minimal instances of principal-
agent conflict. 
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Monitoring/Screening. In 1991, the Military screened and monitored the CADs 
through several mechanisms. In each zone, the CADs were connected to a Base 
Contraguerrilla (BCG), which would respond to the Rondas’ calls for assistance.356  As 
with the CDCs, the committees were permitted to elect their leadership, which would be 
approved by the local military commander.357 Second, The CAD commanders delivered 
weekly intelligence and activity reports to their regional commanding officer. 
Uninterrupted participation in the Sunday meeting was rewarded with more “weapons 
training and instruction, and on occasion, material donations from the state.”358 Third, the 
military maintained a strict inventory of issued firearms and ammunition. Fourth, CADs 
were subjected to surprise military inspections.359 Fifth, in accordance with DS 077, all 
CAD members were required to register their identifying information and a digital 
photograph, which could be cross referenced with mandatory photo ID cards.360 According 
to Fumerton, the IDs were to “help prevent rebel infiltration” of the CADs and to have 
records from which to later “make indemnity payments to the families of those killed in 
the line of duty.”361 Sixth, CAD leadership was required to sign a periodic declaration 
stating that their members did not commit crimes or human rights abuses.362 Lastly, in 
1994, the military established posts in sub-zones to better coordinate oversight over the 
CADs.363 
Rewards/Incentives. After the Rondas were nearly abandoned by the Army to fend 
for themselves during the Garcia administration, DLs 740 and 741 and DS 077 provided 
effective moral incentives to the Rondas by granting them legitimacy and acknowledging 
them as significant players in the state’s COIN strategy, by permitting them to carry actual 
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fire arms, and by providing them better protection from security forces. As with the 
Colombian Hometown Soldiers of 2002, the CADs were considered a part-time reserve 
branch of the Armed Forces and CAD soldiers were given the incentive of serving in their 
home village for one year in exchange for a waiver from mandatory military service in the 
regular armed forces.364  Considering the substandard quality of life associated with 
conscription, performing patrol duties with a CAD at home while being able to protect 
oneself with an actual firearm provided a valuable incentive for Ronderos to comply with 
the state’s new regulations on their operations.  
The CADs depended on the military for all logistic support including arms and 
ammunition. The military mostly provided 12-gauge shotguns to the CADs (according to 
Article 4 of Decree 741), and according to military sources cited by author Carlos Tapia, 
by 1995, the state delivered 16,000 shotguns to approximately 4,200 self-defense 
committees composed of 240,000 members.365  The CADs were also permitted to purchase 
antique bolt-action high-caliber Mauser rifles from the military. According to Fumerton, 
“by virtue of its obsolescence, the Mauser uses an outdated cartridge that is not in common 
circulation in Peru and can only be obtained through the military…a fact that also 
diminished the threat of a future armed peasant uprising…”366   
It should be noted that a dominant theme in this case has been the question of 
arming the Rondas. From the beginning, the state was mostly reluctant to arm the Rondas, 
and even after Decrees 740 and 741 were passed, the quantity and capability of the weapons 
issued to the CADs was greatly limited. It is worth considering the possibility that the 
reluctance of the military to arm the Rondas for most of the war prevented the 
paramilitarized DECAS from proliferating too far beyond the VRA. One could also argue 
that supplying the CADs obsolete rifles and limiting their inventory of shotguns and ammo 
relative to the numbers of CAD members was a practical strategy to keep the Ronderos in 
check. Had the military supplied mass-produced, modern high caliber automatic weapons 
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to the Rondas without restraint, as the Colombians did with the Convivirs, the security 
landscape of Peru may have turned out differently.   
While a few CADs sought out more powerful, long range weapons on the black 
market, most of the CADs stayed within the limits of Decrees 740 and 741 by only using 
authorized weapons.367  Their compliance was not without reservation, however; “Many 
peasants complain[ed] about the inadequacy of the allotment of four or five guns per 
village. They also want automatic weapons, to match the shining path.”368  Consequently, 
a minority of CADs did not necessarily settle for the military issued shotguns; according 
to Fumerton, “they have been able to obtain sophisticated, modern weaponry either illicitly 
or with the unofficial consent of local military commanders.”369  
As with the CDCs, monetary incentives for CAD members were limited to 
community donations and the occasional cash donation from the state, or according to 
Starn, a reward from the military in the form of trucks, tractors, and other supplies.370  I 
have been unable to find evidence of a government sourced regular wage for CAD 
members, despite their membership in the so-called “fourth branch of the armed forces.”  
This comes to little surprise as, according to Kruijt, even high-ranking officers had to work 
side jobs to make an adequate wage and retired general officers were living on $300 per 
month as a pension.371  While Capitulo VI of DS 077 outlines how CADs should manage 
their donations, there is no indication of a wage system for the CAD members. However, 
Article 10 of DS 077 promises pensions and indemnities to injured Ronderos or family 
members of Ronderos killed in action. As of 2015, the Peruvian government has not 
delivered on those promises despite the fact that CADs continue to operate as de facto law 
enforcement in some remote areas of Peru.372  
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Sanctions. Just like in the regular armed forces, Military commanders punished 
CADs for failing to conduct patrols or for shirking or slacking on official duties, to include 
their role in community development projects as defined in DS 077.  “The most common 
form of sanction is to confiscate all firearms of a community for a period of time, which 
leaves the inhabitants feeling virtually defenseless.”373  Other punishments included 
assigning CAD members a week of “menial chores” at the local military base.374  
Moreover, the military and police “did not hesitate to indict civil defense patrollers accused 
of committing violent crimes or engaging in other illegal activities, such as drug 
trafficking.”375 The military started with purging paramilitarized DECAS in Apurimac of 
drug traffickers and corrupt leadership like Huychuaco, who had morphed into a sort of 
Peruvian Carlos Castaño.  
Effectiveness of the CADs. Security studies scholars widely consider the CADs a 
success story in terms of their performance as civil defense groups and their fulfillment of 
the associated responsibilities accorded to them by Decree 741. As standardized rural civil-
defense forces, and incorporated auxiliaries of the armed forces, the CADs complimented 
the revitalized Peruvian Armed Forces well in a clear-hold COIN Strategy. Marks dubbed 
the Rondas as Fujimori’s lynchpin in the broad scheme of his hearts and minds 
counterinsurgency campaign due to their success in assisting the BCGs in securing rural 
areas and displacing the insurgents.  “They were, in effect, an anvil. The hammer was 
provided by the ‘special companies’ and ‘special forces.’”376   Another successful mark of 
the CADs was their contribution to the “resurrection of civil society” in Peru’s neglected 
rural areas,377 which thereby enabled territorial consolidation under the Peruvian 
government. Subsequently, in a war for the people, volunteering in a Ronda gave the 
peasants an alternative to joining the guerrillas by providing them both a means to defend 
themselves and a framework from which to rebuild rural society. The Rondas, as legal arms 
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of the state in rural society, denied Sendero access to both the land and the people it sought 
to exploit for its strength and purpose, while simultaneously extending the state’s reach 
throughout the greater part of its territory. Palomino put it best in stating, “Given the 
absence if the state apparatus in the Rondero areas, it was not only necessary to recognize 
the legitimacy of such grass roots organizations, but it was also important to clarify the 
validity and scope of their various activities in order to avoid doubt and abuses, and also to 
establish adequate control over them.”378 
Conclusion. The case of the Rondas Campesinas contains valuable lessons learned 
on how to regain control of wayward and even paramilitarized militias that had previously 
experienced little to no oversight. It also lends to my thesis that incorporation is the optimal 
approach to civil defense forces and that only after the military has the capacity and legal 
tools to apply a tailored combination of the principal-agent control mechanisms of 
monitoring, screening, sanctions, and rewards, is it able to effectively implement civil-
defense forces in a clear-hold strategy. After the military co-opted and organized the 
Rondas Campesinas as CDCs, it had insufficient involvement in their administration and 
defensive operations, often leaving them vulnerable to guerrilla infiltration or attack. As a 
result, some CDCs (the DECAS of the VRA), with access to income from the drug trade, 
paramilitarized and developed sophisticated offensive capabilities, and a warlord para-
state. Fortunately, the DECAS were not allowed to fester too long and spread their 
influence too far before the Fujimori administration suppressed them, legally incorporated 
all Rondas Campesinas (CADs) into the armed forces, and took measures to improve 
military capacity, which permitted more robust control mechanisms. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In counterinsurgency, states often use pro-government militias to isolate a 
population from insurgents, provide intelligence, and hold an area after it is secured by the 
military, but without proper oversight, these groups are at risk of going rogue. So how do 
sponsor states succeed or fail at maintaining positive control and influence over pro-
government militias? States fail when they grant too much autonomy and firepower to 
militias and they succeed when they limit militias’ autonomy by subjecting them to a 
tailored combination of the control mechanisms of monitoring, screening, sanctions, and 
rewards. Cases from the Colombian and Peruvian civil wars demonstrate that the best way 
to control militias and employ them in counterinsurgency is by incorporating them as 
legitimate auxiliaries of the armed forces. Incorporation of a militia into the armed forces 
greatly reduces the risk of diverging interests and objectives and the future pain of 
demobilization. 
Analysis and Lessons Learned. The Colombia and Peru cases share many 
similarities, chief among them the challenges of low state capacity and the rapid 
proliferation of drug trafficking. However, a key difference between the Peru and 
Colombia cases is as follows: The Colombian armed forces gradually lost control of 
militias in the 1960s through the 1980s, and formed brand new groups under new policies 
after each failure. Conversely, the Peruvian armed forces dealt with the same militias for 
the duration of the conflict, but adjusted their oversight policies as time went on. According 
to Koonings and Kruijt, “the degree and extent of military control progressively intensified, 
rather than decreased, in the course of two decades of civil war in Peru, culminating in the 
ultimate embodiment of political subordination and control—the Comites de Autodefensa 
y Desarrollo (CAD) Legislation.”379 A decade after Peru passed the CAD legislation, 
Colombia echoed Peru with a similar, and equally successful program called the 
Hometown Soldiers. 
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Both Colombia and Peru made multiple attempts to employ pro-government 
militias (civil-defense forces) as force multipliers in a counterinsurgency clear-hold 
strategy against guerrilla insurgents. In each attempt, they faced different constraining 
factors, such as low state capacity, insufficient resources, and the illegal drug trade that 
limited their options for control mechanisms, such as monitoring, screening, sanctions, or 
incentives. In the case of Colombia, an illicit relationship shaped how the military 
delegated operations to the illegal paramilitaries. Some of the constraints were also self-
induced, like the Colombian military’s decision to privatize the funding of the militias, or 
the government’s decision to make the militias illegal only after they were too powerful 
and plugged into the illegal drug trade to effectively enforce demobilization.  
In 1970s-1980s Colombia, the military privatized the funding of the self-defense 
groups, while continuing to provide them arms and direct them in COIN operations, but by 
privatizing their funding to the landed elites and narco-bourgeoisie, the military lost the 
option to use competitive monetary incentives, and gradually relinquished their control 
over the groups to private benefactors. After the groups became too powerful and 
independent through the funding of drug-traffickers, ranchers, and other elites, the state 
passed legislation to ban them, but by then, the groups had already paramilitarized and 
would take enormous effort to suppress. The military was unable and unwilling to prioritize 
suppression of the paramilitaries over fighting the guerrillas, and the paramilitaries still 
shared the same ideology and objectives concerning the guerillas. Illegalization only 
finalized the transition of the paramilitaries into Colombia’s burgeoning criminal space. 
Under the constraints of an illicit relationship, the military had a weaker position relative 
to its paramilitary agents, but continued to delegate operations to the paramilitaries and 
provided arms and impunity as incentives, which also removed the option of applying 
effective sanctions, selecting leadership, or effectively monitoring activities.  
When the security situation worsened in the mid-1990s, Colombia, in all its 
fragility, and fractured geopolitical landscape, took a second stab at organizing self-defense 
forces (the Convivirs), but repeated the same mistakes by outsourcing the organizations’ 
funding to local elites. Armed to the teeth by the military, the Convivirs operated under 
little to no government supervision. Strategically, the Convivirs were likely meant to act 
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as a legitimate means to draw the paramilitaries back into the scope of state authority by 
offering the paramilitaries an open door to reconstitute under the state security apparatus.380  
However, the opposite occurred when the powerful illegal paramilitaries absorbed the 
Convivirs instead. The military also ended up using the Convivirs as a middle man or “legal 
screen”381 to more effectively coordinate with the paramilitaries, instead of controlling the 
Convivirs and using them to rein in the paramilitaries. The Convivir program, which lasted 
just four years, inadvertently caused a spike in the strength and number of illegal 
paramilitaries, which unified under the AUC in 1997. As a monolithic organization of 
Colombia’s paramilitary groups, the AUC independently waged war against the guerrillas, 
and adopted national objectives that competed with those of the state in terms of policy 
toward the guerrillas and the monopoly on territory and use of force.  
In 2002, President Uribe’s Democratic Security Plan and the US-Backed Plan 
Colombia led to an increase in state capacity that permitted the larger, and more capable 
military to displace the AUC in the war against the guerrillas and even make a third attempt 
at creating self-defense forces: the Hometown Soldiers. The state greatly limited the 
autonomy of these new militias by essentially making them a rearguard auxiliary force, 
and a reserve component of the Army and Marines. The part time soldiers were subject to 
robust control mechanisms. Recruits were screened through several processes, they worked 
under strict supervision, and kept their weapons in an armory while off duty. Like soldiers 
in the regular armed forces, they fell under the uniform code of military justice, were 
subject to 10–12 weeks of indoctrination and training, and wore uniforms which made them 
identifiable and accountable to the public. Lastly, they had the incentive of serving just 
part-time in their hometown, receiving a waiver from military conscription and receiving 
education benefits at the end of their service. Even though they received almost no pay, the 
militias had high morale, and they performed their duties with no notable signs of the 
agency dilemma. The Hometown soldiers helped Colombia to establish a security presence 
in previously neglected areas, contributing to state consolidation. 
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Meanwhile, in early 1980s Peru, peasants mobilized grassroots self-defense groups 
to protect themselves against the assault of both the guerrillas and, to a lesser extent, the 
unscrupulous military. The state took notice of the Rondas Campesinas after they attacked 
and slaughtered a guerrilla column in 1983 with nothing more than sticks and rocks, and 
established a semi-official relationship with the groups. Even though the military forced 
all villages in the emergency zones to mobilize Rondas, officially called Civil Defense 
Committees (CDCs), it did not establish robust oversight and control mechanisms over the 
groups, and mostly left them to fend for themselves. As a result, some unsupervised CDCs 
in remote regions of Peru used their status as semi-official militias to pursue private 
interests, and defy local authorities. Moreover, because most CDCs did not have firearms, 
they would shirk their duties and purposely avoid confrontation with guerrillas, allowing 
them to pass through their village unobstructed.   
The Military’s lack of oversight over the CDCs had greater repercussions in the 
drug trafficking region of the Apurimac River Valley in the latter part of the 1980s, where 
the groups (renamed Defensa Civil Antisubversivas, or DECAS) unified under a central 
paramilitary command and expelled the guerrillas from the valley. However, the DECAS 
grew more independent and sophisticated through involvement with the illegal drug trade 
and eventually established autonomous warlord fiefdoms. Fortunately, the DECAS were 
not permitted to fester too long. In 1991, President Alberto Fujimori recalibrated Peru’s 
COIN strategy to standardize all CDCs and DECAS as lightly armed Comites de 
Autodefensa y Desarrollo (CADs), and passed legislation to incorporate them as a “fourth 
branch of the armed forces.” The military came up with a combination of control 
mechanisms that successfully reined in the DECAS and resulted in the CADs performing 
assigned tasks with minimal instances of principal-agent conflict.  
Like the Colombian Hometown Soldiers, the CADs were on a short tether, received 
training, and answered directly to the Peruvian security forces stationed nearby. The 
military carefully limited and tracked their issued weapons, and required members to 
register in a database and acquire a photo ID. An officer in charge (OIC) vetted and 
approved of elected CAD leadership. The CADs were also required to submit weekly 
reports, attend weekly meetings with the OIC, and require proof that they had not 
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committed human rights abuses. Lastly, military commanders punished CADs for failing 
to conduct patrols or for shirking or slacking on official duties by temporarily confiscating 
firearms or assigning individual CAD members a week of undesirable chores at the military 
base. Most importantly, the military and police arrested and prosecuted Ronderos accused 
of engaging in illegal activities.  
As the reviewed cases demonstrate, arming militias with restricted use weapons and 
granting them too much autonomy is a guaranteed recipe for disaster. The risk of 
paramilitarization and warlordism is not worth the reward of a higher guerrilla body count 
or reduction in guerrilla territory. In reviewing the cases, I drew the following conclusions:  
A) State capacity is a deciding exogenous factor in the control of PGMs. A 
successful whole-of-government counterinsurgency plan requires significant resources to 
execute, as do civil-defense forces (CDFs), which themselves require manning, training, 
and equipping. Overstretched security forces with low capacity will have a difficult time 
sacrificing personnel and resources to apply adequate control mechanisms. Ironically, low 
state capacity is often the very reason weak states employ PGMs or why civilians 
spontaneously form PGMs382 (the citizens need security and the military has an immediate 
need for cheap force multipliers), but the state does not have the resources to maintain 
positive control over militias after distributing arms and permitting them to use lethal force. 
The optimal way to break out of this vicious cycle is to improve state capacity. Colombia 
and Peru were able to successfully control and implement PGMs in re-invigorated COIN 
campaigns only after seeing significant economic improvements; Colombia received a 
large injection of military aid through Plan Colombia and refocused its COIN strategy 
through President Uribe’s Democratic Security Plan (DSP), while Peru saw economic 
reforms and stabilization, a more capable and unified military, and a renewed intelligence-
focused COIN strategy under President Fujimori (despite his other shortcomings as a 
democratically elected leader). Böhmelt and Clayton, on the other hand, argue that state 
capacity is not crucial to sustaining relationships with semi-official PGMs.383  While this 
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may be true in the short term—if the state only uses the PGM for plausible deniability (in 
which case impunity is a sufficient incentive)— resources will eventually be necessary for 
alternative incentives as the war progresses and the relationship evolves. Moreover, as seen 
in both the Colombia and Peru cases, the militias grew out of control during the times that 
the governments were at their weakest. As I assert in my thesis, eventually the state must 
incorporate the PGMs as auxiliaries, and this requires improved capacity. 
B) In a narco environment, control mechanisms will have less overall effect over 
militias, especially monetary incentives. Once a militia becomes enmeshed in the narco 
ecosystem, it has access to more competitive sources of income through the illicit drug 
trade, which constrains a military’s options for control mechanisms. Monetary incentives 
from the military cannot compete with those of drug traffickers, which is why militias must 
be incorporated directly into the armed forces, as Peru did with the Rondas Campesinas.  
Subsequently, are monetary incentives necessary at all? In both success cases, the 
Peruvian CADs were not paid, and the Hometown Soldiers were very poorly paid. RAND 
authors Connable and Libicki play with the notion that unpaid, part time militias may be 
more dependable than paid, full-time militias: “since the paid [fulltime] militia members 
are primarily motivated by money, they are also more vulnerable to infiltration, bribery, 
desertion, and defection.”384 However, militia members, like all citizens, need salaries to 
provide for their families. Paid or not, screening should filter out recruits that are singularly 
motivated by money and not protecting their village. Thus, in a narco environment, a short 
tether and a combination of monitoring, screening, sanctions, material and logistical 
support, and well-designed non-monetary incentives should be sufficient to mitigate the 
principal-agent problem. 
C) States should avoid privatization of militia sponsorship at all costs. Preventing 
the privatization of sponsorship should prevent another principal from assuming control 
over a militia, and prevent the military from losing its leverage. One could argue that the 
privatization argument is flawed because the Peruvian CADs received private funds, but 
did not paramilitarize like the Colombian self-defense groups. Even though the CADs did 
                                                 
384 Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End, 148. 
 105 
in fact receive funding from village donations, the military, with its improved capacity, had 
strong enough control mechanisms (monitoring, screening, and sanctions) in place to 
provide a counterbalance and ensure that the CADs were not coopted by local elites or drug 
cartels. Moreover, the eradication of the latifundia in the 1960s may have prevented an 
elite oligarchy from funding the CADs to protect their private interests. Legislation under 
Fujimori also created regulations for how the CADs should manage these donations. The 
Colombians, on the other hand, privatized funding of their self-defense groups to the 
highest bidder (and with no apparent selectivity) while in a weakened state of capacity, and 
without applying strong mechanisms to counterbalance the effects of privatization. 
Nonetheless, I do not recommend privatization regardless of how strong the military is or 
how good the control mechanisms are; giving private citizens financial control over an 
armed group is never a good idea. 
D) Criminalizing militias without suppressing them first will make them more 
difficult to control. As demonstrated by the Colombian case, the anti-paramilitary/self-
defense group legislation removed the paramilitaries, and later the Convivirs, from the 
military’s legal COIN apparatus and sealed their transition into the criminal domain, further 
reducing the military’s ability to exert organizational controls or even conduct damage 
control efforts. The military thus lost whatever legal influence it had over the groups and 
missed an opportunity to reverse the damage done by privatization. As illegal armed 
groups, the paramilitaries then became the military’s instruments of plausible deniability, 
and both the military and paramilitaries evaded the accountability that would be afforded 
to an state-recognized self-defense force. Small sanctions also had little to no effect in an 
informal/illicit relationship as larger sanctions could impact high ranking personnel 
involved in collusion. Peru, on the other hand, continuously recognized the Rondas 
Campesinas as semi-official CDFs through the duration of the conflict, even during the 
DECAS years, and eventually cracked down when it need to purge the Rondas of narco 
elements. 
E) Because civil-defense forces are meant to be defensive and part of a clear-hold 
COIN strategy, they should only receive training in, and take part in defensive operations. 
In both cases, once militias shifted to conducting offensive operations, they amassed 
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territory from the guerillas. As offensive forces, the Colombian paramilitaries and Peruvian 
DECAS were able to extract war taxes and establish para-states in the territory they gained, 
which further eroded the state’s monopoly on its own territory and the use of force. The 
clear and hold COIN strategy is meant to retake positive control of territory and its 
associated tax revenues for the state. Once the military moves on, self-defense groups may 
only guard the reclaimed territory under the condition that the military keeps them 
defensive and dependent on the government. 
F) Civil Defense Forces need weapons to defend themselves and prevent guerrillas 
from returning to cleared areas, but the state should place limitations on the type and 
quantity of weapons it issues. In the case of Peru, the state was mostly reluctant to arm the 
Rondas until 1991, after which the quantity and capability of the weapons issued to the 
CADs was greatly limited. The reluctance of the military to arm the Rondas for most of 
the war may have prevented the paramilitarized DECAS from proliferating too far beyond 
the VRA. One could also argue that supplying the CADs obsolete rifles and limiting their 
inventory of shotguns and ammo relative to the numbers of CAD members was a practical 
tactic to keep the militias in check. Had the Peruvian military repeated the mistakes of 
Colombia with the Convivirs and supplied restricted-use weapons to the Rondas without 
restraint, especially before it could gain positive control over the groups, the security 
landscape of Peru may have turned out differently. I would like to note that quantitative 
data on weapons transfers to PGMs in Colombia (if it exists) would provide a clearer 
picture than the qualitative data (historical accounts) I used in this analysis. 
Reflection on Sources and Questions to Consider for Future Research. I drew 
my conclusions from a macro view of the conflict from open-source material available in 
the United States. The non-transparent, and sometimes illicit nature of these relationships 
has meant that primary sources available can be spotty and even biased, particularly on the 
military side. Declassified U.S. Embassy and intelligence documents were particularly 
informative concerning the military’s role as principal in the relationship, but because the 
Colombian military largely denied its delegation to illegal paramilitaries, and not all 
officers or units associated with the paramilitaries, I have had to rely on these U.S. 
documents, the court testimonies of paramilitary members, and interviews with 
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paramilitary members conducted by Human Rights NGOs or the press. Consequently, I 
have little detailed information on the specifics of Colombian military’s delegation to 
paramilitaries other than what I could obtain from the above sources. For example, almost 
all available sources unanimously agree that the military turned a blind eye to massacres 
and assassinations, so I was able to confidently infer that impunity was a primary incentive. 
However, while it is verified that the Colombian military supplied weapons and some 
logistic support to the militias, I did not have information on the exact results this incentive 
achieved in each situation. Detailed accounts of shirking and slack by paramilitaries may 
someday be obtained from a candid retired officer or declassified documents. A more 
complete picture would benefit from archival in-country research, first-hand interviews, 
and the results of the post-war Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was launched 
in December 2017.  
Another challenge I met was that there were far less declassified U.S. State 
Department and intelligence agency documents on the Peru case, particularly concerning 
the Rondas Campesinas. As a result, I relied largely on Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission report, human rights reports, news articles, and a proportionately larger 
number of secondary sources than with Colombia in order to obtain the necessary 
information to gauge the details of the relationship between the Peruvian military and the 
militias at each stage of the war. For example, Mario Fumerton’s book, From Victims to 
Heroes: Peasant Counter-Rebellion and Civil War in Ayacucho, Peru, 1980–2000 had very 
granular information from his field work with the Rondas Campesinas detailing how they 
were organized, how they evolved, their tactics, and how they perceived the military and 
the enemy. However, the book, as the title suggests, is mostly from the point of view of the 
Rondas, and lacked a fleshed out Peruvian military perspective on the militias. On this 
matter, a visit to the Peruvian archives and interviews with officers that oversaw Ronda 
militias would produce enlightening information.  
In my research, the following questions arose that were out of the scope of this 
thesis, but warrant future research: First, how do civil-military affairs impact the military’s 
relationship with PGMs? The civil-military affairs situation in Colombia and Peru certainly 
impacted how the military dealt with the militias. For example, the Peruvian Army’s retreat 
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to the barracks in protest against the democratically elected government in the mid-1980s 
significantly reduced the military’s involvement with the CDCs. Political disunity and 
corruption in the Colombian bureaucracy allowed high ranking military officers to get 
away with delegating human rights abuses and extrajudicial operations to the paramilitaries 
for years. A detailed study on the impact of the principal-agent relationship between the 
civilian government and the military385 on the control of PGMs would add significant value 
to the body of PGM literature. Second, what level of state capacity is required to apply 
adequate control mechanisms e.g., what is the price tag on a PGM?  A detailed calculation 
or estimate of the cost of incorporating PGMs like the CADs or the Hometown Soldiers 
into the state security apparatus, and the cost of applying control mechanisms would aid 
interagency COIN planners down the road. 
Concluding Remarks. When the United States plays a COIN advisory role or 
foreign internal defense role for a host nation, it should consider the above conclusions 
when determining how aid is allocated, and how much funding and resources the host 
nation requires to control PGMs. More often than not, PGMs play either supporting or 
center stage roles in civil conflicts, and should be suppressed and, or incorporated before 
they grow too powerful and autonomous. Governments should also consider the long-term 
repercussions of using illegal PGMs for plausible deniability. This type of cooperation 
damages the government narrative and civil society, and may present barriers to war 
termination should a powerful militia fail or refuse to demobilize properly (the AUC’s 
post-demobilization transformation into BACRIMs illustrates this point). Coopting or 
absorbing a militia is a better alternative to a painful demobilization process down the road.  
The government should also act as early as possible before militias become too out 
of hand. The example of Ukraine illustrates this point as well as my point about 
incorporation: after 2014, Ukraine grappled with some 30 out-of-control PGMs that had 
proliferated in response to the Crimea Crisis.  “The government drew a line: all independent 
pro-Ukrainian paramilitary groups would either join the official armed forces or face 
demobilization by any means necessary. The Ukrainian government acted at the right 
                                                 
385 Peter Feaver wrote a comprehensive book on how civilians control the military: Armed Servants: 
Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003). 
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time—that is, when its army was strong and public opinion was on its side.”386 During the 
integration process, the government screened members to root out Neo-Nazis and 
criminals. Men that did not pass background checks were given the alternative of joining a 
“civilian volunteer corps to help the war effort; these corps assisted police, cleared 
snow…and even worked on a public radio.”387 The government took creative approaches 
to groups that refused incorporation by exploiting internal rifts, and offering fighters 
military service with full benefits in exchange for deserting their militias, or otherwise face 
prison.388 While Ukraine still struggles to suppress splinter groups and other rising far-right 
vigilante groups (like the “National Militia”), it avoided certain disaster by incorporating 
most of the militias when it did. 
In conclusion, pro-government militias or civil-defense forces are a useful way to 
extend the state’s security presence into ungoverned spaces, access valuable intelligence, 
and hold areas cleared by the military in counterinsurgency operations, but they need to be 
under the close supervision of the military in order to prevent paramilitarization on the 
scale of the Colombian AUC. The cases of Peru and Colombia demonstrate that a state 
cannot implement a civil-defense program in a counterinsurgency just by handing over 
arms to civilians without strict control mechanisms (monitoring, screening, sanctions and 
rewards) and a short tether. A weak state with a corrupt socio-economic environment, and 
a myriad of alternative actors that could provide better incentives than the military such as 
Colombia’s should never organize PGMs, or give weapons to an independently organized 
PGM without resources to apply strict control measures, and a very short tether.  
  
                                                 
386 Vera Miranova and Ekaterina Sergatskova, “How Ukraine Reined in its Militias: Lessons for Other 
States,” Foreign Affairs (Snapshot), August 1, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2017-
08-01/how-ukraine-reined-its-militias. 
387 Miranova and Sergatskova. 
388 Miranova and Sergatskova. 
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